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Abstract
The present dissertation reports a set of three studies that sought to characterize
the effects of self-focused cognition on emotion regulation, specifically, cognitive
reappraisal. Across the three studies, I investigated the effects of self-distancing,
disengagement of self-focused thought, and changing the content of self-focused thought
on multiple measures of emotion regulation success and emotion regulation difficulty.
Results broadly suggested that disengaging self-focused cognition provides distinct
advantages for emotion regulation, which are independent of effects on emotional
reactivity. Specifically, I observed that other-focused cognition resulted in equally
successful, but less difficult emotion regulation, the ability to more quickly disengage
from self-focused thought was associated with greater emotion regulation success, and a
greater tendency towards engaging in self-focused thought was associated with increased
emotion regulation difficulty. I discuss the possible mechanisms explaining these effects,
their specific implications for the study of emotion regulation, as well as their broader
implications for the study of self-regulation.
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Chapter One: Theoretical Background
The self has largely been conceptualized as an interface between the environment
and the individual, allowing for flexible behavior that goes beyond simple instantiations
of stimulus-response associations (e.g. Baumeister, Masicampo, & Vohs, 2010). Several
branches of psychology have studied what can generally be termed self-focused
cognition, oftentimes by contrasting it with other-focused cognition. Examples of
processes studied under the umbrella of self-focused cognition include: autobiographical
memory, self-focused attention, and self-control. Other-focused cognition has
emphasized studying processes like: face perception, mentalizing, and social interaction.
The distinction between self-focused cognition and other-focused cognition as
different modes of processing information was first established in the domain of memory,
where it was observed for the first time that the two had different downstream
consequences. Specifically, it has been found that self-focused cognition was associated
with better recall on a later memory test, compared to other-focused cognition. This
became known as the “self-referential encoding effect” (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977).
Memory theorists were swift to suggest that the effect of self-focused cognition in this
case was an example of the depth of processing effect, in so far as the self could be
conceptualized the most elaborate cognitive schema available to an individual (Klein &
Kihlstrom, 1986). More recently, however, social neuroscience has made a fairly strong
case against this, suggesting instead that self-focused cognition is a qualitatively different
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kind of processing, evidenced by its engaging a different set of brain regions than might
be expected from deeper semantic processing alone (Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley,
Macrae, Wyland, et al., 2002; Macrae, Moran, Heatherton et al., 2004). Most notably,
this kind of cognition has been found to preferentially engage the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC) and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) close to the precuneus (Johnson
et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae et al., 2004). Interestingly, the vmPFC and PCC
are highly metabolically active, even at rest, and part of the so-called “default mode” of
brain function (Gusnard, Arbudak, Schuman, & Raichle, 2001; Raichle, McLeod, Snyder
et al., 2001). These regions’ activity while engaging in self-focused cognition closely
mirrors their activity at rest, whereas the same regions appear to deactivate when
engaging in other-focused cognition (Kelley et al., 2002). This suggested that engaging in
other-focused thought might be a particularly well-suited way of disengaging from selffocused thought, a dichotomy that I will continue to come back to as an important way to
characterize self- and other-focused cognition.
A slightly different characterization of self- and other-focused cognition proposes
that the two exist on a continuum of distance from the self, and distinguishes between
close or more intimate others and distant or less intimate others. According to this
account, information about close others is processed in a manner that is similar to the
processing of information about the self. This kind of processing has similar (though
smaller) effects on memory, and relies on some of the same medial prefrontal brain
2

regions that are typically associated with self-focused cognition (see Wagner, Haxby, &
Heatherton, 2012). Adopting a previous term from research on relationship development
in romantic couples (Aaron, Aaron, & Smollan, 1992; Aaron, Aaron, Tudor et al., 1991),
this phenomenon has been called “inclusion of other in the self” (see Wang et al., 2011).
To date, a large portion of the literature on self-focused cognition has prioritized
investigating the ways in which this type of cognition contributes to memory (see
Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013 ) and goal directed behavior (see Scheier & Carver,
2014). By comparison, fewer studies have focused upon how this type of cognition
impacts emotional processes. This dissertation examined how the two phenomena
identified above, disengaging from self-focused thought and self-distancing, influence
emotional processes. It did so using a series of studies that compared and contrasted the
effects of different kinds of self-focused and other-focused cognition on two important
(and distinct) concepts in the emotion literature: emotional reactivity and emotion
regulation. These effects were investigated in the context of cognitive reappraisal, an
emotion regulation strategy that involves reinterpreting a situation with a focus on
changing one’s emotional response to it (Gross, 1998; Giuliani & Gross, 2009).
As a cognitive strategy for regulating emotion, reappraisal provides a
conceptually well-suited context for investigating the effects of self-focused cognition on
emotion regulation. Considered one of the most effective strategies for changing the
experience, expression, psychophysiology, and neural signature of emotional responding
3

(Gross & Thompson, 2007), cognitive reappraisal is also notably difficult to implement,
and there is considerable variability in how well it works (McRae, Jacobs, et al., 2012).
These characteristics of cognitive reappraisal warrant exploring: (1) whether there are
ways of reappraising that result in more successful and/or less difficult regulation, and (2)
whether there are individual differences that influence reappraisal success and difficulty.
The studies I report in this dissertation investigated both of these possibilities,
specifically as they relate to self-focused and other-focused cognition.
Importantly, whereas other studies of emotion regulation have focused almost
exclusively on comparing the success of different strategies in achieving their emotional
goal (McRae et al., 2010; McRae, 2013), the present set of studies examined difficulty
along with success of emotion regulation, in order to reach a better understanding of the
effects of self-focused cognition on emotion regulation. To date, very few studies have
looked at differences in difficulty between different kinds of emotion regulation
strategies, although a few authors agree that considering the cognitive costs of regulation
may be equally as important as considering regulation success (Gruber, Harvey, & Gross,
2012; Mauss & Gross, 2007).
Self-Focused Cognition and Emotional Reactivity
There is a vast theoretical literature that describes the role of the self in emotion
generation. This literature affords interesting, more specific hypotheses about the role of
the self in emotion regulation. Early cognitive theories of emotion (Arnold, 1960;
4

Lazarus, 1966) ascribed a monumental role to self-focused cognition in the emotion
generation process, suggesting that an emotional response would not arise if a stimulus or
situation were not perceived as having some sort of relationship with the self. In Arnold’s
own words, “to arouse an emotion, an object must be appraised as affecting me in some
way, affecting me personally as an individual, with my particular experience and my
particular aims” (Arnold, 1960, pp.171, italics added). Nonetheless, modern appraisal
research has not focused on testing this particular tenet of Arnold’s theory.
Some of the most relevant groundwork for examining how self-focused cognition
impacts emotion generation was laid down by Duval and Wicklund (1972) in their
Objective Self-Awareness theory. The gist of this theory is that attention can be directed
not only outward, at the situation, but also inward, at the self. The latter state, termed
self-awareness, has been associated with a propensity to more readily process cues in the
environment as self-relevant (Hull & Levy, 1979), and to respond emotionally to these
cues (Fenigstein, 1979). There is a great deal of support for the notion that self-awareness
intensifies emotional responding to experimentally-induced situations (Duval &
Wicklund, 1972; Fenigstein, 1979; Scheier, 1976; Scheier & Carver, 1977; Scheier &
Carver, 1983; Scheier, Carver, & Gibbons, 1979). The same is true of self-consciousness,
a trait that determines people’s general propensity to focus attention on themselves
(Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1972). Nonetheless, all of the studies identified above used
designs that collapsed across reactivity and regulation, most of them using a global
5

measure of emotionality, such as the display of anger in response to an experimentally
created situation (e.g. Scheier, 1976). It is thus not known to what extent self-focused
cognition influences mechanisms of reactivity, and to what extent it influences
mechanisms of regulation. This is to a large extent because the notion of separating
reactivity and regulation came about more recently, with the advent of emotion regulation
theory (e.g. Gross, 1998; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002).
Self-Focused Cognition and Emotion Regulation
Emotion regulation refers to systematic and intentional changes in intensity,
duration, or the psychological and psychophysiological processes associated with
activated emotions (Gross, 1998; Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004). This important concept
insists that individuals are not mere witnesses of their own emotional reactions, but they
have the remarkable ability to strategically influence which emotion they feel, when, and
for how long (Gross, 1998). What is more, this ability is a key aspect of healthy
psychosocial functioning (Gross & Muñoz, 1995; Mayer & Salovey, 1995; Gross, 2001;
Gross & John, 2003).
To date, emotion regulation has been studied almost exclusively in self-focused
cognitive contexts, by asking people to regulate their own emotion (Zaki & Williams,
2013). As a result, the contributions of self-focused cognition to emotion regulation are
not well understood. This is because self-focused cognition has never been systematically
varied in an experimental paradigm that separates emotional reactivity and emotion
6

regulation. This kind of experimental paradigm would be a prime avenue to explore when
looking to elucidate the role of self-focused cognition in emotion regulation.
More specifically, the question that remains unanswered is whether reliance on
self-focused cognition impacts one’s ability to regulate emotion, independently of any
impact on initial emotional reactivity. The importance of this question is underscored by
the known consequences of emotion regulation for both physical and social well-being
(see Gross, 2001; Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Muñoz, 1995; Mayer & Salovey, 1995).
Furthermore, excessive self-focus and deficient emotion regulation co-occur in numerous
affective disorders, for example depression, dysphoria, and social anxiety (see Mor &
Winquist, 2002). Based on this, it is reasonable to ask whether self-focused cognition
may have undesirable effects on emotion regulation. If this were true, an important
follow-up question would be whether those undesirable effects can be mitigated, e.g. by
decreasing self-focus or shifting attention away from the self at the moment when
regulation occurs.
The few lines of research that have touched upon these notions are those on
rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), self-distancing (Kross
et al., 2009; Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Kross & Ayduk, 2009; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel,
2005) and mindfulness-based stress reduction (Goldin, Ramel, & Gross, 2009; Goldin &
Gross, 2010; Goldin, Ziv, Jazaieri et al., 2012), which are reviewed separately below.

7

Rumination is an aspect of self-thought that is characterized by repetitive and
passive thought about negative emotions, focusing on symptoms of distress (NolenHoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Overall, this literature suggests that
ruminative components of self-thought often increase or prolong distress and are
positively related to depression and other psychopathologies (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991;
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), particularly in clinical samples, and in response to
autobiographical recall (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). Self-distancing,
or using a third-person perspective when reflecting on one’s own emotional state, has
been studied primarily in autobiographical contexts, whereby individuals were asked to
reflect on past emotions (Ayduk & Kross, 2010). In contrast, mindfulness, a meditation
technique thought to foster non-identification with self-views (Kabatt-Zinn, 1990), has
been studied primarily in terms of its effects on present-focused emotional states.
Together, observations from studies of self-distancing and mindfulness reveal that both of
these techniques are effective at reducing negative emotional responses. Overall, these
observations align with the notion that reducing reliance on self-focused cognition helps
reduce the intensity of emotional responses (see Ayduk & Kross, 2010; Goldin & Gross,
2010).
Nonetheless, neither the rumination literature, nor those on self-distancing or
mindfulness-based stress reduction provide a decisive answer to whether or not their
effects are specific to the emotion regulation process, as they frequently use designs that
8

involve global measures of emotionality, and do not often distinguish between reactivity
and regulation (see Troy et al., 2013).
Integrative Summary
The extant literature suggests that reliance on self-focused cognition during
emotion regulation may have important consequences, and that these consequences may
not always be adaptive. However, there are no studies to date that report having
manipulated self-focused cognition in a controlled experiment that quantifies its effects
on emotion regulation independently from its effects on emotional reactivity. Basic
research addressing this gap in the literature could weigh in on the extent to which
emotion regulation could benefit from disengaging self-focused thought. Down the road,
this could inform therapies that more precisely target the cognitive dynamics of emotion
regulation.
If self-focused thought indeed has the effects I hypothesize on emotion regulation,
one important question that arises is at what level do these effects operate? One
characteristic of self-focused thought that many have postulated is that they can be very
hard to escape or disengage from (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Indeed, some individuals’
attempts to escape self-focus go as far as binge eating, alcohol abuse, and deliberate selfharm (Baumeister, 1990; Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991). However, not all individuals
find it equally difficult to disengage from self-focused thought, and indeed some can do it
relatively easily (see Muraven, 2005). Individual differences in whether one can flexibly
9

disengage from self-focused thought could be an important determinant of emotion
regulation outcomes. If inflexible self-focused cognition affects emotion regulation, then
reducing this inflexibility could be a valuable tool for improving emotion regulation.
As mentioned before, a cognitive manipulation that has previously been used to
shift attention away from the self has been asking people to focus their attention on
another person instead. Studies contrasting self- and other-referent cognitive processing
(Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae et al., 2004) have reliably used other-focus as a way to pull
attention away from the self in information processing. These studies suggest that brain
activity typically associated with self-focused cognition is reduced when engaging in
other-focused cognition (Kelley et al., 2002). The effects of adopting an other-focus on
the person’s own emotion regulation, however, are as of yet unknown. Manipulating selfand other-focus in tightly controlled emotion regulation experiments could provide
important insights into the cognitive mechanisms that can be strategically recruited to
buffer against the maladaptive effects of excessive or inflexible self-focus.
In this dissertation, I propose that asking people to bring other-focused thoughts
online during regulation, specifically during cognitive reappraisal, is an effective tool for
disengaging self-focused cognition, and in turn could act as a buffer against the effects of
inflexible self-focused cognition on emotion regulation. More generally, comparing the
effects of different kinds of self-focused cognition on emotion regulation could deliver
important insights for the emotion regulation literature, which has until now not
10

considered a self vs. other dimension as a determinant of regulation outcomes. The same
kind of experiment could also inform the social cognition literature, which does not
typically consider self- and other-focused cognition in terms of their effects on emotion.
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Chapter Two: General Approach
The present dissertation aimed to make a substantial contribution to the study of
self-focused cognition and emotion regulation by: (1) testing the novel hypothesis that
bringing online other-focused cognition during emotion regulation buffers against the
detrimental effects of self-focus, (2) establishing whether the ability to more easily
disengage from self-focused thought is associated with less difficult emotion regulation,
and (3) investigating whether changing the content of self-focused thought, without
disengaging from it, has any effect on emotion regulation.
Dependent Measures
Across the three studies, the primary dependent measures were emotion
regulation success, or the degree to which emotion was changed in accordance with the
regulatory goal (McRae, 2013), and emotion regulation difficulty, or the cognitive effort
expended during regulation, both of which were assessed using multiple measures. To
measure emotion regulation success, I used self-reported emotional experience, in the
form of valence (Studies 1-3) and arousal ratings (Study 1) acquired trial-by-trial, in
order to infer the extent to which negative emotion had decreased during a regulation
condition compared to a non-regulation condition. To measure emotion regulation
difficulty, I used self-reported post-task estimates of difficulty (Studies 1-3), as well as
performance on a subsequent self-control task (Study 1) as a proxy for the amount effort
participants had expended while regulating their emotion.
12

For each study, I used either a picture- or film-based reappraisal task, the core structure
of which has been used by several other laboratories (Gross, 1998; Mauss, Cook, Cheng,
& Gross, 2007; Troy, Wilhelm, Shalcross, & Gross, 2010; Ochsner et al., 2002; Sheppes
& Meiran, 2007) that relies on carefully controlled visual stimuli that are thought to elicit
similar amounts of negative emotion across participants (Gross, 1998), rather than
idiosyncratically-chosen self-relevant stimuli which result in greater variance across
participants in the amount of negative emotion elicited and may obscure experimental
effects (see Salas, Radovic, & Turnbull, 2012). This type of task is well suited for
detecting behavioral and psychophysiological differences in emotional responding. Used
in a within-participants design (Studies 2 and 3) the task produces robust estimates of
reappraisal success, that are separate from estimates of emotional reactivity. Used in a
mixed within- and between-participants design (Study 1) the same task allowed me to
estimate the mental fatigue or regulatory depletion effects of cognitive reappraisal under
different conditions, such as relying on self- and other-focused thought.
Under the assumption that self-control is a limited resource (Muraven &
Baumeister, 2000; Muraven, Tice & Baumeister, 1998), studies from the regulatory
depletion literature have successfully used performance on subsequent self-control tasks
to infer how effortful a previous task was. The task that I chose to use as a proxy for
emotion regulation effort was a handgrip endurance test (Baumeister, Bratslavski,
Muraven, & Tice, 1998). I predicted that self-reported differences in emotion regulation
13

difficulty will manifest as differences in performance on a handgrip endurance test
administered immediately after the emotion regulation task.
Overview of Studies and Predictions
In Study 1, I used a between-participants experimental design to investigate
whether other-focused cognition has an adaptive impact on emotion regulation outcomes,
and whether this adaptive effect is more likely to operate via a self-disengagement
mechanism, or a self-distancing mechanism.
In order to elicit use of other-focused cognition during emotion regulation, I asked
participants to generate reappraisals for negatively-valenced film clips as if they were
trying to change how a close other (a good friend) was feeling. I predicted that
reappraising an emotional event with a focus on a close other would result in downregulation of negative emotion that is more successful and/or less difficult, compared to
reappraising the same emotional event with a focus on the self. To explore whether or not
the benefits of using other-focused cognition arise via disengagement of self-focused
thought only, or whether there are additional benefits to self-distancing, I added a third
condition where I instructed participants to generate reappraisals with a focus on a distant
other (an acquaintance), and assessed how emotion regulation success and difficulty in
this condition compared to the other two conditions.
In Study 2, I used a within-participants correlational design to clarify whether the
ability to flexibly disengage self-focused cognition is associated with improvements in
14

emotion regulation. Participants’ ability to flexibly disengage self-focused cognition was
assessed using a task-based measure. This involved comparing reaction times to an
interrupting sound while participants were engaged in self- or other-focused thought. I
predicted that participants would experience more successful and/or less difficult emotion
regulation the faster they were able to disengage from self-focused thought compared to
other-focused thought.
Finally, in Study 3, I again used a between-participants experimental design, and
sought to establish whether disengagement of self-focused thought was necessary in
order to improve the success and difficulty profile of emotion regulation, or whether
changing the content of self-focused thought would be sufficient.
In order to change the content of self-focused thought, participants performed a
self-reflection task in which they either wrote about themselves as unique and different
from others, wrote about themselves as similar to others, or wrote about a topic that was
not meant to be induce self-reflection. I predicted that participants in the self-reflection
conditions would experience less successful and/or more difficult emotion regulation than
participants in the control condition. Crucially, if changing the content of self-focused
thought were sufficient to influence emotion regulation, participants who wrote about
themselves as similar to others would experience more successful and/or less difficult
emotion regulation than participants that thought about themselves as unique individuals.
If, however, changing the content of self-thought were not sufficient to influence emotion
15

regulation success or difficulty, there would be no significant differences in emotion
regulation success or difficulty between the two self-focusing conditions.
Significance
Overall, an examination of the role of self-focused cognition in emotion
regulation stands to provide important insights for the emotion regulation literature,
which to date has not strongly considered self-focused cognition as a moderator of
regulation outcomes. Although studies on rumination, self-distancing, and mindfulness
have provided some evidence for the existence of such a link, it is unclear whether their
effects on emotion regulation (beyond not always controlling for reactivity) are
necessarily mediated via elicitation of strong, self-relevant emotion, that predisposes to
rumination, or whether a more general aspect of self-focused cognition might be at play.
If the latter is correct, insights from the current set of studies could be more broadly
extended to negative emotion in the general population, rather than being restricted to
clinical samples.
More generally, the set of studies using the general paradigm described above
stand to provide meaningful insights for the social cognition literature, which has
traditionally studied self-focused and other-focused cognition independently of emotion.
If hypotheses are correct, there may be important applications of the phenomena I
describe for improving emotion regulation in various populations that currently struggle
with it (Joorman & Gotlib, 2010).
16

My main predictions for this set of studies are about emotion regulation difficulty,
or the cognitive effort required to regulate emotion. These are novel predictions, in so far
as studies have not typically considered difficulty when comparing emotion regulation
strategies, but instead have focused on success. This is a case where the emotion
regulation literature and the broader self-control literature really diverge. Even though
success is important, the effort with which success is achieved could have important
consequences. For example, difficulty could affect the frequency with which a selfcontrol strategy is attempted in daily life. A strategy that is perceived as too difficult to
implement is unlikely to be employed very often, however successful it may be. From
this perspective, manipulating a process like cognitive reappraisal in a way that makes it
less difficult to implement has the potential to increase the use of this strategy, and be
particularly beneficial for individuals for whom cognitive or regulatory resources are
limited, for example adolescents (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; Steinberg, 2005) or in
situations in which these resources are likely already depleted, such as high stress or
mental fatigue (Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, 2006; Troy et al., 2010; Grillon,
Quispe-Escudero, Mathur, & Ernst, 2015)
The effects of self-focused cognition on emotion regulation success, if any, will
aid in the interpretation of any difficulty findings. The distinction between self- and
other-focused cognition could be important for emotion regulation success as well as
difficulty, in which case the adaptive effects of other-focused cognition would be
17

convincing, but difficulty and success would be confounded with one another. Significant
effects of self-focused cognition on emotion regulation difficulty, in the absence of any
effects on emotion regulation success, would actually rule out this important confound,
suggesting that participants do not merely use difficulty and success interchangeably in
self-report, and do not over-report difficulty as an after-the fact justification for failing at
the task. Instead, this kind of success-difficulty profile would give credence to the notion
that the two are indeed separable constructs, and that a difficulty-success tradeoff (see
Locke & Latham, 2002) is not impossible to bypass. So far, the most convincing way to
bypass this tradeoff for acts of self-control (including emotion regulation) has been habit
formation to a point where these highly controlled processes become automatic
(Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999; Mauss et al., 2007). There is a considerable time
investment in achieving this automaticity, in practice. By comparison, achieving a similar
effect (for emotion regulation at least) using a simple framing manipulation requires very
little time investment.
Beyond the direct implications it has for emotion regulation theory and
applications, the proposed set of studies could also have important implications for
theories of self-control more broadly. Although the precise mechanism responsible for
mental fatigue or depletion effects is not known (Berkmann & Miller-Ziegler, 2012), an
often-overlooked tenet of extant self-control theories postulates that resources getting
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depleted during acts of self-control are caused by an inherent aspect of self-focused
cognition, hence the term “ego” depletion (Baumeister et al., 1998).
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Chapter Three: Study 1
For Study 1, I hypothesized that reinterpreting a negative event as if to decrease a
close other’s negative emotion would result in: (1) successful emotion regulation for the
participant generating these reinterpretations, as indicated by a significant decrease in
self-reported negative emotion in a regulation condition compared to a condition where
regulation wasn’t attempted; and (2) either more successful or less difficult regulation of
negative emotion, compared to reinterpreting in order to decrease one’s own negative
emotion.
Furthermore, I also sought to explore whether the mechanism responsible for such
an effect was likely to be a self-distancing mechanism, or a self-disengagement
mechanism. I did so by examining whether the effect of interest, i.e. more successful or
less difficult emotion regulation when reappraisal is focused on another compared to self,
depends on whether the other person is a Close Other (a friend) or a Distant Other (an
acquaintance). Emotion regulation success that increases the more distant the other
person is from the self, or emotion regulation difficulty that decreases in the same
manner, would suggest a self-distancing mechanism might be responsible for any
improvements in emotion regulation. However, emotion regulation outcomes that do not
further improve with increased distance from the self would instead support a
disengagement mechanism as more like

20

Participants and Design
A total of N=96 student volunteers (66 female) from the University of Denver
between the ages of 18 and 35 years old took part in the study in exchange for extra credit
towards an introductory psychology course.
The primary measure in the study was performance on an emotion regulation task
that used a 3x3 mixed design, with Condition (‘Self’, ‘Close Other’, and ‘Distant Other’)
varied between participants, and Trial Type (‘Look Neutral’, ‘Look Negative’, and
‘Change Negative’), varied within participants. Continuous measures of
psychophysiological responding were collected during each trial, and self-report
measures of negative emotion and arousal were collected after each trial. After the
emotion regulation task, all participants completed a handgrip endurance test
(Baumeister, Bratslavski, Muraven, & Tice, 1998), which served as a proxy measure for
the amount of effort they had expended during the emotion regulation task. At the end,
participants filled out a detailed debriefing survey that included questions about the
emotion regulation task, as well as several questionnaires that assessed individual
differences in emotional responding, which were used in exploratory analyses.
Procedure
The study relied on a film-based variation of the main reappraisal task described
under General Approach. This was preferred due to the extended stimulus presentation
time of film stimuli (compared to pictures), which is well-suited for detecting differences
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in psychophysiological responding. However, data on psychophysiological responding
will not be reported here. The stimuli consisted of 3 film clips that were 2 minutes and 40
seconds long, one for each Trial Type (‘Look Neutral’, ‘Look Negative’, ‘Change
Negative’). These film clips were selected from a previously validated library for
emotion elicitation using films (Gross & Levenson, 1995). The ‘Look Neutral’ film clip
was part of a documentary about Denali National Park, whereas the ‘Look Negative’ and
‘Change Negative’ film clips were extracted from the movies 21 Grams, and The Champ,
respectively. The latter two film clips were matched in valence and intensity based on
ratings acquired in previous studies (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Ray, 2007).
Participants watched the ‘Look Neutral’ film first, followed by the ‘Look
Negative’ film, and, finally, the ‘Change Negative’ film. In order to maximize
interpretability of comparisons between conditions, this order was kept the same for all
participants, without counterbalancing. Immediately after seeing each film (and having
followed the instruction it was paired with), participants were asked to indicate how
much negative emotion they felt (‘How NEGATIVE do you feel right now?’) on a scale
from 0 (‘not at all negative’) to 9 (‘extremely negative’), as well as their general arousal
(‘How CALM or EXCITED do you feel right now?’) on a scale from 0 (‘completely
calm’) to 9 (‘extremely excited’). Because effects of regulation may lag behind the
stimulus presentation period in the case of film stimuli, participants were instructed to
rest for one minute after each film presentation, after which they were asked again to rate
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their negative emotion and general arousal, using the same scales, before proceeding to
the next trial.
Each participant was randomly assigned to and completed the emotion regulation
task above in one of three experimental conditions: ‘Self’(n=31, 21 female), Close
Other’(n=33, 23 female), or ‘Distant Other’(n=32, 22 female). Participants in the Self
condition received reappraisal training typical of previous investigations and were told
that they would see a variety of short films preceded by an instruction to either allow
themselves to react naturally (Look) or think about ways of reinterpreting the events
depicted so they feel less negative (Change). Participants in the Close Other and Distant
Other conditions received a modified reappraisal training and were told to first identify a
close friend (or an acquaintance) by name, then imagine throughout that this person is
viewing the films at the same time as they are. For the ‘Look’ instruction, participants
were told to let themselves and their friend or acquaintance react naturally. For the
‘Change’ instruction, participants were told to think about ways of reinterpreting the
events depicted so their friend/acquaintance feels less negative emotion. Negative
emotion and arousal ratings immediately after the films as well as after the break all
referred to how the participant felt (not their friend or acquaintance).
Immediately after the emotion regulation task, participants completed a handgrip
endurance test, which has been used in the past as a measure of regulatory effort
expended on the previous task (Baumeister et al., 1998). For this test, participants were
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given a hand exerciser consisting of two handlebars connected via a metal spring, and
were instructed to pull the two handlebars together and maintain that grip for as long as
they could. Based on a model in which self-control is viewed as a limited resource, the
more effort participants expended on the previous task, the shorter the amount of time
they maintain the grip on the hand exerciser should be. Crucially, this test always
followed the ‘Change Negative’ trial, which was always last in the sequence, in order to
most closely reflect the amount of cognitive effort expended during regulation.
At the very end, participants completed a detailed debriefing questionnaire. This
started with open-ended questions about the task instructions participants remembered
receiving (‘What were you instructed to do during the LOOK trials?’, ‘What were you
instructed to do during the CHANGE trials?). Each participant’s answers to these
questions were evaluated for instruction compliance by two independent raters in order to
determine whether any exclusions were necessary.
After each open-ended instruction recall question, participants were asked to
make ratings of task difficulty, which was assessed separately for the Look and Change
instructions (‘How difficult was it for you to follow this instruction?, accompanied by a 9point Likert scale anchored at ‘1’ = ‘not difficult at all’ and ‘9’ = ‘very difficult’).
Participants in the Close Other and Distant Other conditions also indicated how close
they felt to the person they had thought of during the emotion regulation task, using the
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Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale (Aaron, Aaron, & Smollan, 1992). A diagram of this
scale is depicted in Figure 1.
Finally, participants filled out a set of questionnaires assessing individual
differences in emotional responding: mood over the previous 2 weeks (PANAS; Watson,
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), emotion regulation in daily life (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003),
empathy (IRI; Davis, 1983), and depression (BDI; Beck, Ward, & Mendelson, 1961).
Each participant’s summary scores on these scales (and relevant subscales) were used in
exploratory analyses in order to gage their association with emotion regulation success
and emotion regulation difficulty.
Data Analysis Approach
Instruction Compliance. Each participant’s answers to each of the two
instruction recall questions were coded for compliance by two independent raters, using a
binary code for compliance vs. non-compliance. Participant’s answers were coded as
compliant if they suggested there was a separation between the ‘Look’ and ‘Change’
instructions, and if they aligned with their respective condition (Self, Close Other, or
Distant Other). Any answers indicative of having used emotion regulation for the ‘Look’
instruction, having used techniques other than reappraisal during the ‘Change’
instruction, or not having thought of the Self, a Close Other, or a Distant Other
(depending on condition), were to be coded as non-compliant, and eliminated from all
subsequent analyses.
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Manipulation Check. Closeness ratings from the Inclusion of Other in Self
question were submitted to a General Linear Model (GLM) with Condition (Close Other,
Distant Other) as an independent variable. Evidence of a difference between the two
conditions, such that participants in the Close Other condition would rate themselves
significantly closer to the person they thought of during the emotion regulation task than
participants in the Distant Other condition, would indicate a successful manipulation of
distance from self in the two conditions.
Negative Emotion and General Arousal. Participants’ subjective ratings of
negative emotion and general arousal immediately after each film, as well as after the
break, were submitted to repeated measures GLMs. Due to the larger amounts of missing
data for the two questions after the break, answers to each question were submitted to
separate analyses.
Condition (Self vs. Close Other vs. Distant Other) was manipulated between
participants, therefore it applied to each of the ‘Look Neutral’, ‘Look Negative’, and
‘Change Negative’ trials. I examined the main effects of Trial Type and Condition, as
well as interactions that would indicate Condition has a different impact in the context of
reactivity (‘Look Negative’ vs. ‘Look Neutral’ contrast for each condition) and regulation
(‘Change Negative’ vs. ‘Look Negative’ contrast for each condition).
Subjective Difficulty. Ratings of task difficulty were collected separately for
each Instruction (‘Look’ and ‘Change’). These single ratings were also submitted to
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repeated measures GLMs. Using the same logic as the analyses for negative emotion and
general arousal ratings, I examined main effects of the experimental manipulation, as
well as interactions indicating that the manipulation had a different impact in the context
of reactivity (‘Look’ instruction) and regulation (‘Change’ instruction).
Handgrip Endurance. In order to more objectively compare emotion regulation
difficulty across the three conditions (Self, Close Other, Distant Other), I used the
performance indices from the handgrip endurance test as a proxy for the amount of
regulatory effort expended during the (previous) emotion regulation task. This measure
was collected only once, immediately after the emotion regulation task. Because
endurance could be heavily influenced by individual differences in grip strength, I first
examined whether there were any outliers, defined as participants whose handgrip
endurance times were more than 2 standard deviations away from the overall mean. After
removing outliers, participants’ endurance times were submitted to a simple GLM with
Condition as an independent variable, in order to determine whether reappraisal required
different amounts of effort in the three conditions.
Associations Between Emotion Regulation Success and Difficulty. Using the
same criteria as above for outlier exclusion for the handgrip endurance measure, I
performed a set of correlation analyses in order to determine whether there was any
association between handgrip endurance and self-reported difficulty following the Look
or Change instructions, emotion regulation difficulty scores based on differences in self27

reported difficulty for the Change and Look instruction, and emotion regulation success
scores based on differences in self-reported negative emotion (or self-reported arousal)
after the Look Negative and Change Negative films.
Exploratory Correlations with Individual Differences. After reversing relevant
items, average scores were calculated for each of the following scales and subscales:
positive and negative mood over the previous 2 weeks (PANAS; Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988), frequency of using reappraisal, expressive suppression, and situation
selection in daily life, as well as frequency of emotion regulation in general (ERQ; Gross
& John, 2003), fantasy, perspective taking, empathic concern, and personal distress (IRI;
Davis, 1983), and depression (BDI; Beck et al., 1961). After investigating the internal
consistency for each scale and subscale, using Crohnbach’s α, each individual difference
was entered as a covariate in a repeated measures GLM in order to determine whether it
interacts with Condition in predicting either negative affect, arousal, or subjective
difficulty ratings. Those individual differences that did not interact with condition in
predicting either negative emotion, general arousal, or subjective difficulty, were
submitted to exploratory correlation analyses to determine their association with taskbased measures of emotion regulation success and emotion regulation difficulty,
calculated as difference scores.
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Hypotheses
With respect to emotion regulation success, I hypothesized that other-focused
reappraisal would result in greater decreases in negative emotion than self-focused
reappraisal. Specifically, I predicted a Trial Type and Condition interaction, such that
differences in negative emotion between the Look Negative and Change Negative trials
would be smaller in the Self condition, compared to both the Close Other and Distant
Other conditions. I expected the same to be true of the difference between Look Negative
and Change Negative trials for the general arousal ratings.
With respect to emotion regulation difficulty, I predicted that reappraisal in the
Close Other and Distant Other conditions would be perceived as less difficult than
reappraisal in the Self condition. For the Distant Other condition, I tested two competing
mechanisms for the effects of other-focused thought: a self-distancing mechanism and a
self-disengagement mechanism. If reappraisal in the Distant Other condition is
significantly less difficult than reappraisal in the Close Other condition, this would be
consistent with a distancing mechanism. If, however, there are no differences in difficulty
between the Distant Other and Close Other conditions, this would in turn support a selfdisengagement mechanism. Predictions about handgrip endurance, interpreted as a
measure of effort, mirrored those about difficulty.

29

Results
Instruction Compliance. All participants were rated as having complied with the
instructions corresponding to their respective conditions (Self, Close Other, or Distant
Other, with unanimous agreement between the two raters. Therefore, no exclusions were
deemed necessary. All following analyses are based on a total of 96 participants, out of
which 31 were in the Self condition, 33 were in the Other condition, and 32 were in the
Distant Other condition. Any deviations from these numbers are due to missing data.
Manipulation Check. On the Inclusion of Other in Self measure, participants in
the Close Other condition rated themselves significantly closer (M=5.34, SD=1.47) to the
person they thought of during the emotion regulation task, compared to participants in the
Distant Other condition (M=2.32, SD=.87), indicating that the Close vs. Distant Other
manipulation was successful, F(1,61)=97.42, p < .001. This effect is illustrated in Figure
2.
Self-Reported Negative Emotion. All participants rated their negative emotion
immediately after the video, however a total of 9 out of the 96 participants did not also
provide a rating for their negative emotion after each break. Results are reported below.
All significance tests are 2-tailed, and fractional degrees of freedom indicate GreenhouseGeisser adjustments for significant differences in error variance between the three
conditions, suggested by results of Mauchly’s test of sphericity. Results of post-hoc tests
have not been corrected for multiple comparisons.
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Immediate Effects of Reappraisal. There was a significant main effect of Trial
Type, F(2, 186)=483.77, p < .001. Thus, there was an overall difference in the amounts of
negative emotion participants felt after the Look Neutral, Change Negative, and Look
Negative films. Post-hoc paired samples t-tests indicated that there was a significant
reactivity effect, t(95)= –29.85, p < .001. Across conditions, participants reported feeling
more negative emotion after the Look Negative film (M=5.97, SD=1.79) compared to the
Look Neutral film (M=.18, SD=.60). There was also a significant effect of regulation,
t(95)=3.72, p < .001. Across conditions, participants reported feeling significantly less
negative emotion after the Change Negative film (M=5.24, SD=1.98) compared to the
Look Negative film (M=5.97, SD=1.79).
There was no significant effect of Condition, F(2,93)=1.43, p > .245, thus there
was no sufficient evidence to indicate that, across Trial Type, there were differences in
the amount of negative affect participants reported in the three conditions.
There was also no interaction between Trial Type and Condition, F(4,186)=1.58,
p > .183. Thus, there was no sufficient evidence to indicate that the effect of Trial Type
was different between the three conditions.
Overall, I did not find sufficient evidence that using other-focused cognition
results in more successful down-regulation of negative emotion than using self-focused
cognition. These results are illustrated in Figure 3. I was unable to reject the null
hypothesis that generating cognitive reappraisals with a focus on a Close Other or a
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Distant Other results in equally successful emotion regulation as generating those
cognitive reappraisals with a focus on the Self. There was also no significant difference
between the Close Other and Distant Other conditions in emotion regulation, thus I failed
to find conclusive evidence that further distance from self would result in a significant
increase in emotion regulation success.
Delayed Effects of Reappraisal. A significant effect of Trial Type was still
present one minute after the films, F(1.86, 155.90)=132.26, p < .001. Thus, across
conditions, there were differences in the amount of negative emotion participants
reported after the Look Neutral, Change Negative, and Look Negative films. Post-hoc
paired samples t-tests indicated significant emotional reactivity, t(86)= –13.51, p < .001,
in that participants reported more negative emotion after the Look Negative film
(M=3.16, SD=1.98) than the Look Neutral film (M=.21; SD=.65). A significant
regulation effect was also present, t(86)=2.47, p < .016, in that participants reported
significantly less negative emotion after the Change Negative film (M=2.75, SD=1.81)
compared to the Look Negative film (M=3.16, SD=1.98).
There was no significant effect of Condition, F(2,84)=2.05, p > .136, thus there
was no sufficient evidence to indicate that, across Trial Type, there were differences in
the amount of negative affect participants reported in the three conditions.
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There was also no significant interaction of Trial Type and Condition,
F(3.71,155.90)=.82, p > .505, thus I was unable to assert that the effect of Trial Type was
different in any of the three conditions.
Overall, these results suggest that the reactivity and regulation effects endured for
at least one minute after the films. Even though participants were instructed to just rest,
the effects of reappraisal could still be observed at this time, as participants felt less
negative emotion after the Change Negative film, than they did after the Look Negative
film. Although this is not a novel result with respect to generating cognitive reappraisals
for the Self, it does help exclude any delayed costs of generating reappraisals with a focus
on a Close Other or Distant Other, such as a rebound in negative emotion after
participants have stopped reappraising.
Self-Reported General Arousal. A total of 16 out of the 96 participants did not
provide a rating for their general arousal immediately after each film. Results for
Immediate effects of Reappraisal below are thus based on data from 80 participants, out
of which 22 were in the Self condition, 28 were in the Close Other condition, and 30
were in the Distant Other condition. Similarly, a total of 7 participants did not provide
arousal ratings after the break. Results for Delayed Effects of Reappraisal below are thus
based on a total of 89 participants, out of which 28 were in the Self condition, 31 were in
the Close Other condition, and 30 were in the Distant Other condition. In a similar vein to
the previous negative affect analyses, significance tests are 2-tailed, and fractional
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degrees of freedom indicate Greenhouse-Geisser adjustments for significant differences
in error variance between the three conditions, suggested by results of Mauchly’s test of
sphericity. Results of post-hoc tests have not been corrected for multiple comparisons.
Immediate Effects of Reappraisal. There was a significant effect of Trial Type,
F(1.69,129.92)=53.90, p < .001, indicating there was an overall difference in the amounts
of negative emotion participants felt after the Look Neutral, Change Negative, and Look
Negative films, respectively. Post-hoc paired samples t-tests indicated that a significant
reactivity effect was present, t(79)= –8.69, p < .001. Participants reported higher levels of
general arousal after the Look Negative film (M=4.29, SD=1.82) compared to the Look
Neutral film (M=1.65; SD=2.10). However, there was no significant effect of regulation,
t(79)=1.58, p < .119, even though participants reported lower levels of general arousal
after the Change Negative film (M=3.95, SD=1.88) compared to the Look Negative film
(M=4.29, SD=1.82).
There was no significant effect of Condition, F(2,77)=.35, p > .710, thus there
was no sufficient evidence to indicate that, across Trial Type, there were differences in
the amount of general arousal participants reported in the three conditions.
There was also no significant interaction of Trial Type and Condition,
F(3.37,129.92)=.78, p > .519, thus no sufficient evidence to indicate that the effect of
Trial Type was different in the three conditions.
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I did not find sufficient evidence that using other-focused cognition results in
more successful down-regulation of general arousal, compared to using self-focused
cognition, thus I was unable to reject the null hypothesis that generating cognitive
reappraisals with a focus on a Close or Distant Other results in equally successful downregulation of general arousal as generating those cognitive reappraisals with a focus on
the Self.
Delayed Effects of Reappraisal. A significant main effect of Trial Type,
F(1.73,148.70)=31.91, p < .001, was still present after a one minute delay. Post-hoc
paired samples t-tests indicated a significant reactivity effect, t(88)= –6.91, p < .001,
whereby participants still reported higher levels of general arousal after the Look
Negative film (M=2.54, SD=1.81) compared to the Look Neutral film (M=1.03;
SD=1.82). There was also a significant effect of regulation, t(88)=2.69, p < .01, as
participants reported lower levels of general arousal after the Change Negative film
(M=2.13, SD=1.58) compared to the Look Negative film (M=2.54, SD=1.81).
There was no significant effect of Condition, F(2,86)=.30, p > .740, thus once
again there was no sufficient evidence to indicate that, across Trial Type, there were
differences in the amount of general arousal participants reported in the three conditions.
There was no significant interaction between Trial Type and Condition,
F(3.46,148.70)=.63, p > .617, thus not enough evidence to suggest that the effect of Trial
Type was different in any of the three conditions.
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Even though participants were instructed to just rest, there were effects of
reappraisal on general arousal that could be observed at this time, as participants felt
more calm after the Change Negative film, than they did after the Look Negative film.
These results suggest that there are delayed effects of reappraisal on general arousal,
while also helping to exclude any delayed costs of generating reappraisals with a focus on
a Close Other or Distant Other, such as a rebound in general arousal after participants
have stopped reappraising.
Emotion Regulation Difficulty. Participants’ subjective estimates of task
difficulty provided after the emotion regulation task were submitted to a 3 X 2 Repeated
Measures ANOVA with Instruction (Look, Change) as a within-participants factor and
Condition (Self, Close Other, Distant Other) as a between-participants factor.
There was a significant main effect of Instruction, F(1,93)=94.87, p < .001.
Participants reported having experienced significantly more difficulty when following the
Change instruction (M=3.65, SD=2.07), compared to the Look instruction (M=1.42,
SD=.95). Thus, across conditions, generating reappraisals for self or other was more
difficult than not generating any reappraisals at all.
There was no significant main effect of Condition, F(2,93)=1.52, p > .224,
however there was a significant interaction between Instruction and Condition,
F(2,93)=3.28, p < .043, indicating that the effect of Instruction was different in the three
conditions. Follow-up GLMs indicated that difficulty ratings for the Look instruction did
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not differ by Condition, F(2,93)=.64, p >.531. This suggests that following an instruction
to watch a film and keep another person in mind while doing so (without generating
reappraisals) is not significantly more difficult than following an instruction to simply
watch a film, without keeping another person in mind. However, a trend-level effect of
Condition was present when comparing difficulty ratings for the Change instruction only,
F(2,93)=2.79, p < .067, suggesting that there were slight differences in how difficult it
was to follow this instruction for the Self, Close Other, and Distant Other conditions.
Post-hoc independent samples t-tests indicated that participants in the Self condition
(M=4.29, SD=2.33) found it significantly more difficult to follow the Change instruction,
t(62)=2.30, p < .026, compared to participants in the Close Other condition (M=3.09,
SD=1.83), but not compared to participants in the Distant Other condition (M=3.59,
SD=1.93), t(61)=1.30, p > .20. However, although difficulty ratings for Change
instruction in the Distant Other condition were slightly increased compared to the Close
Other condition, this difference was not significant, t(63)= –1.08, p < .285.
In line with these hypotheses, keeping a Close Other in mind and generating
reappraisals as if one was trying to decrease how negatively that person was feeling, was
less difficult for participants than simply generating those reappraisals in order to
decrease one’s own negative emotion. This, however, was not the case when the other
person was a Distant Other. Keeping a Distant Other in mind and generating reappraisals
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as if one was trying to get them to feel better was comparable in difficulty to generating
reappraisals with a focus on changing one’s own feelings.
A different way to follow-up on the same Instruction by Condition interaction is
using a set of follow-up independent samples t-tests with the difference score between
participants’ difficulty ratings following the Change and the Look instructions as a
dependent variable, and Condition as an independent variable. Conceptually, these
difference scores are equivalent to a measure of difficulty generating reappraisals, above
and beyond simply looking at a negative image, and above and beyond having to keep
another person in mind. The results are illustrated in Figure 4. Comparisons indicated
that participants in the Self condition experienced significantly greater difficulty
generating reappraisals compared to participants in the Close Other condition, t(62)=2.54,
p < .015, but not compared to participants in the Distant Other condition, t(61)=1.61, p <
.113 (although the latter could be considered a trend-level effect), and there were no
significant differences between emotion regulation difficulty in the Close Other and
Distant Other conditions, t(63)= –.89, p > .458.
This latter pattern of results suggests that cognitive reappraisal is less difficult
when using other-focused cognition, however the effect is less robust when focusing on a
Distant Other rather than a Close Other. Thus, I was able to reject the null hypothesis that
generating cognitive reappraisals with a focus on the Self, a Close Other, and a Distant
Other is equally difficult. Furthermore, there was no convincing evidence that further
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distance from the self would result in any further decrease in emotion regulation
difficulty. In other words, disengagement of self-focused cognition appeared to be the
more likely mechanism responsible for generating cognitive reappraisals with less
difficulty, rather than a mechanism based on self-distancing.
Handgrip Endurance. Participants’ handgrip endurance times ranged between 0
and 75.43 seconds (M=22.18, SD=19.21), and had a positive skew. In order to make sure
comparisons between conditions are not affected by outliers, I excluded data points that
were more than 2 standard deviations away from the mean. Because the data still
presented a positive skew after the first iteration of exclusions, this procedure was
performed twice. The total number of excluded data points was 12, which amounted to
12.5% of the total. The final set of scores included 84 data points ranging from 0 to 47.07
seconds (M=16.36, SD=11.78). Of the final 84 data points, 26 were in the Self condition,
32 in the Close Other condition, and 26 in the Distant Other condition.
Data without outliers were submitted to a GLM with Condition (Self, Close
Other, Distant Other) as an independent variable. There was a significant main effect of
Condition, F(2,81)=3.87, p < .026, indicating that participants’ handgrip endurance times
were significantly different in the three conditions. Post-hoc independent samples t-tests
indicated that participants in the Close Other condition (M=19.52, SD=13.48) had
significantly longer handgrip endurance times, t(56)= –2.72, p < .010, than participants in
the Self condition (M=11.35, SD=8.04). Participants in the Distant Other condition
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(M=17.49, SD=11.43) also exhibited longer handgrip endurance times compared to
participants in the Self condition, t(50)= –2.24, p < .031, however there were no
significant differences between participants’ endurance times in the Distant Other and
Close Other conditions, t(56)=.61, p > .544. These results are illustrated in Figure 5.
Overall, this pattern of results is very similar to that obtained using the difference
score between subjective difficulty for the Change and Look instruction above, and
suggests that cognitive reappraisal was significantly less effortful using other-focused
cognition, particularly when focusing on a Close Other rather than a Distant Other. Thus,
I was again able to reject the null hypothesis that generating cognitive reappraisals with a
focus on the Self, a Close Other, and a Distant Other requires equal amounts of effort.
And in the absence of any evidence that further distance from self would result in any
further decrease in effort when generating reappraisals, disengagement of self-focused
cognition appears to be sufficient for generating cognitive reappraisals with less effort.
Associations Between Emotion Regulation Success and Difficulty. There was a
significant negative correlation between handgrip endurance times and subjective
estimates of difficulty following the Change instruction, r(84)= -.20, p < .033, such that
greater handgrip endurance was associated with lower ratings of difficulty for the Change
instruction. In contrast, there was no significant correlation between handgrip endurance
and subjective estimates of difficulty following the Look instruction, r(83)= –.04, p >
.733. Emotion regulation difficulty above and beyond simply watching a film and above
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and keeping or not keeping another person in mind, as measured by the difference score
between ratings for the Change and Look instructions, was not correlated with handgrip
endurance, r(83)= –.15, p > .170. This pattern of results suggests that performance on the
handgrip endurance test may have been representative of the total effort expended during
reappraisal, rather than a pure measure of reappraisal effort independent of keeping
another person in mind.
Emotion regulation success based on differences in negative emotion ratings after
the Look Negative and Change Negative films, was not significantly correlated with
either difficulty following the Look instruction, difficulty following the Change
instruction, or handgrip endurance (p > .450 in each instance). Emotion regulation
success based on differences in arousal ratings was also not significantly correlated with
either difficulty following the Look instruction, difficulty following the Change
instruction, or handgrip endurance (p > .384 in each instance). The two emotion
regulation success scores were, however, significantly correlated with one another,
r(75)=.38, p < .001.
The pattern of correlations between these four measures provides good
convergent and discriminant validity for emotion regulation success and emotion
regulation difficulty, and supports the idea that each of them are valid constructs.
Exploratory Correlations with Individual Differences. All individual
difference scales and subscales exhibited high internal consistency (Crohnbach’s α > .75
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in each instance). None of the eleven individual differences interacted with Condition to
predict negative emotion, general arousal, or subjective difficulty (p > .325 in each
instance), thus all were used in exploratory correlational analyses, which collapsed across
Condition. Statistics are reported separately for emotion regulation success and emotion
regulation difficulty measures. As all analyses were exploratory, p-values are not
corrected for multiple comparisons, and represent 2-tailed significance tests.
Individual Differences Related to Emotion Regulation Success. Reappraisal
success scores based on negative emotion and arousal ratings, respectively, calculated as
differences between the ratings provided immediately after the Look Negative and
Change Negative films, were submitted to an exploratory correlational analysis with all
sixteen individual differences listed above. Although there was a significant correlation
between the two emotion regulation success scores, r(96)=.40, p < .001, they exhibited
entirely different patterns of associations with individual differences.
Successful down-regulation of negative emotion did not exhibit any significant or
trending correlations, positive or negative, with any of the eleven individual differences.
Successful down-regulation of arousal, however, exhibited trend-level
correlations with two individual differences, and significant correlations with another two
(out of eleven total). Specifically, participants who experienced more complete downregulation of arousal immediately after the film also tended to report more positive mood
over the previous two weeks, r(86)=.19, p < .088, and that they used expressive
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suppression more frequently in their daily lives, r(86)=.20, p < .078. The same
participants were significantly more likely to report that they regulated their emotion
more frequently in their daily lives, r(86)=.27, p < .013, and that they experienced more
empathic concern towards others, r(85)=.24, p < .032.
Together, these results suggest that a measure of emotion regulation success based
on self-reported arousal may be rooted in individual differences in mood, and the
frequency of using various emotion regulation tactics in daily life. Interestingly,
experiencing more empathic concern towards others also seemed to be related to better
subjective downregulation of arousal, which in turn suggests that better regulators may
allow themselves to experience more empathic concern. Nonetheless, it should be noted
that none of these results would survive correction for multiple comparisons for
confirmatory hypothesis testing.
Individual Differences Related to Emotion Regulation Difficulty. Emotion
regulation difficulty scores, calculated as differences in subjective difficulty ratings when
following the Change and Look instructions, were also submitted to an exploratory
correlational analysis with the same eleven individual differences used in the previous
analysis.
Emotion regulation difficulty was correlated with three out of the eleven
individual differences. Participants who reported more difficulty generating reappraisals
also reported more empathic concern towards others, r(95)=.26, p < .013, greater
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susceptibility to fantasize and daydream, r(95)=.21, p < .039, and greater personal
distress in emergency situations, r(95)=.24, p < .023.
Given that the elicitation of negative emotion in the task used was dependent on
participants empathizing with the characters in the film clips, it is likely that these
associations reflect the nature of the stimuli used for this task, and may not apply in the
same manner to the regulation of other types of negative emotion, or to the regulation of
positive emotion.
Discussion
The results of this study confirmed that it is possible to recruit other-focused
cognition in service of regulating one’s own emotion. In the absence of an explicit
instruction to down-regulate their own emotion, the amount of negative emotion
participants reported after Change Negative, Look Negative, and Look Neutral trials was
comparable between the three conditions of the experiment. This is a novel result, as no
experiments to date have shown effects of other-focused cognition on the emotion of the
person reappraising, or that it could function as an equally effective variation of the
typical self-focused cognitive reappraisal.
The study also suggests that the detrimental effects of self-focused cognition on
emotion in general, strongly implied in the extant literature, may be in part due to the way
this type of cognition impacts emotion regulation. Specifically, participants’ use of selffocused cognition did not have any observable effects on emotional reactivity, but did
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have effects on emotion regulation, namely it increased emotion regulation difficulty.
This supports the tenet that, in addition to success, difficulty or effort is a useful way of
characterizing emotion regulation (Gruber, Harvey, & Gross, 2012; Mauss & Gross,
2007; McRae et al., 2010). Although the previous literature generally established
cognitive reappraisal as a difficult process (Gross, 2002), susceptible to showing mental
fatigue or depletion effects on subsequent self-regulation tasks (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, &
Chatzisarantis, 2010), few studies have focused on comparing the amount of difficulty
that characterizes particular emotion regulation strategies. Study 1 exemplifies two ways
in which one might do so, the first one using a self-report measure of difficulty, and the
second one using a handgrip endurance test administered right after the regulation trial.
The fact that the two measures of difficulty were significantly correlated, and showed the
same pattern across the three experimental conditions, suggests that emotion regulation
difficulty, although not correlated with success in this task, is a valid theoretical
construct. In fact, difficulty and success not being related in this task provides good
divergent validity, and may help explain other counterintuitive observations in the
emotion regulation literature, for example how clinically depressed individuals
experience lower emotion regulation success than normal controls, despite investing
considerable more effort in regulation (Johnstone, vanReekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson,
2007; Gruber, Harvey, & Gross, 2012).
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Aside from delivering insights about self-focused cognition, Study 1 also
illustrated that using other-focused cognition when regulating emotion resulted in equal
emotion regulation success, that was being achieved with less effort (or difficulty). This
highlights a specific way to improve emotion regulation, and opens the door for direct
applications of this type of cognitive framing, for example in therapy. An emotion
regulation strategy that is perceived to be less difficult might be more likely to be
adopted, increasing its use, and in turn having positive effects on personal well-being (see
McRae et al., 2012).
Other-focused cognition may not be the only way to buffer against the effects of
self-focus, and indeed other techniques seem to achieve adaptive outcomes for emotion
regulation, such as spatial distancing (D’Argembeau, 2007; Koenigsberg et al., 2010) or
temporal distancing (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006). However, none of these
studies have focused upon the importance of a continuum of distance from the self for
emotion regulation outcomes, as they most typically have compared only one
“distancing” and “non-distancing” condition (Berkman & Lieberman, 2009). In Study 1,
because I used more than one “distancing” condition, and because increased distance
from Self did not result in a further decrease in emotion regulation difficulty, I am able to
make an important suggestion that the mechanism at play is likely to be disengagement of
self-focused cognition, rather than a mechanism based on distance.
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The astute reader may have also noticed that, in so far as other-focused
reappraisal is less difficult than self-focused reappraisal, this bears a certain similarity to
an emotion regulation strategy called distraction, which also appears to be less difficult
when compared to self-focused reappraisal, and is effective in the moment but is
frequently associated with a rebound in negative emotion in the longer term (NolenHoeksema, 1991; Kross & Aiduk, 2008). Although the re-assessment of negative emotion
in Study 1 could still be considered relatively short-term, the effects of other-focused
reappraisal on negative emotion persisted for at least one minute, whereas its effects on
general arousal emerged at the one-minute mark, with no differences between otherfocused reappraisal and self-focused reappraisal at either point in time. Because of this,
one should be disinclined to conclude that other-focused reappraisal has hidden costs
relative to self-focused reappraisal.
Interestingly, across conditions, cognitive reappraisal had significant effects on
self-reported negative emotion right away, whereas its effects on self-reported general
arousal were only significant after a delay. This may dissuade researchers from asking
participants about their general arousal level in favor of negative emotion, especially if
time is a constraint and only immediate assessment is involved. Nonetheless, I found that
estimates of emotion regulation success based on the amount of downregulation of
general arousal participants experienced right away (rather than those based on negative
emotion) were more robustly associated with individual differences in emotion regulation
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frequency in daily life, and also tended to be associated with how often participants
reported suppressing their emotions in daily life. In contrast, estimates of emotion
regulation success based on immediate reports of negative affect were not associated with
any of the individual differences assessed. Although a positive association between
emotion regulation frequency in daily life and emotion regulation success on laboratory
tasks is generally expected, this is not always the case when the measure of success
involves subjective estimates of negative emotion (e.g. Troy et al., 2010). The present
study in turn suggests that there may be more variability, and more opportunity for
intervention, when it comes to the effects of reappraisal on self-reported arousal, which
may be worthwhile for future studies to explore (see McRae, 2013).
Overall, Study 1 provided good evidence that other-focused reappraisal results in
equally successful, but less difficult emotion regulation, and suggested that the
mechanism for these effects is a disengagement of self-focused cognition. Nonetheless,
the evidence in favor of this mechanism was indirect, based on the exclusion of a more
nuanced, self-distancing mechanism. Future studies should focus on examining more
direct evidence in favor of self-disengagement, for example whether the ability to
spontaneously disengage from self-focused thought is associated with reduced emotion
regulation difficulty. If this is correct, there may be additional opportunities to improve
emotion regulation via re-training self-focused thought, in a manner similar to
mindfulness-based stress reduction (Kabatt-Zinn, 1990) but focused on specific
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characteristics of self-focused thought, as suggested by other researchers (e.g. Bishop,
2002; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006).
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Chapter Four: Study 2
Study 1 broadly suggested that the advantages of other-focused reappraisal may
rely on disengagement of self-focused thought, which in turn would facilitate emotion
regulation. This conclusion, however, was based on the absence of a difference in
emotion regulation difficulty when other-focused cognition involved a Distant Other,
compared to a Close Other. In Study 2, I aimed to conceptually replicate the results of
Study 1 by performing a direct test of the disengagement hypothesis.
Using a task-switching paradigm to measure the relative ease or difficulty with
which participants disengage from self-focused thought compared to other-focused
thought (Muraven, 2005), I then examined whether individual differences in performance
on this task were related to either emotion regulation difficulty, or emotion regulation
success.
Previous studies have suggested that the ability to disengage from self-focused thought is
inversely related to depression and anxiety (Ingram, 1987, 1990; Muraven, 2005).
However, the relationship between the ability to disengage from self-focused thought and
the ability to regulate emotion has not yet been investigated using a paradigm that
separates emotion regulation from emotional reactivity. Based on results from Study 1, I
predicted that participants will be less successful at down-regulating negative emotion, or
they will find it more difficult, or both, the harder it is for them to disengage from selffocused thought.
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Participants and Design
Study 2 employed a correlational design, and used a combined sample of 89
young adults from the Denver area. There were two subsamples of participants, one of
which consisted of theatrical and studio artists(N1=40) originally recruited for a larger
study investigating individual differences in mentalizing and emotional processing. The
second subsample consisted of undergraduate students who were attending the University
of Denver (N2=46).
The larger study that the theatrical and studio artists were recruited for included
several additional tasks, all of which came before the emotion regulation task, and are not
part of this dissertation. In addition, participants had to fulfill quite stringent criteria in
order to be eligible for this larger study, which included being eligible for magnetic
resonance imaging, and either having a college-level degree in art, or having been a union
member for their specific artistic profession for over 3 years. These participants received
monetary compensation at a rate of $20 for every hour of their participation.
Conversely, participants from the student subsample completed only the tasks and
questionnaires relevant for this study, and did not have to fulfill any eligibility criteria
other than being at least 18 years old. As compensation for their time, these participants
received extra credit towards an introductory psychology course.
Across the two subsamples, the measures of interest for Study 2 were: an emotion
regulation task and a post-task debriefing questionnaire similar to those used in Study 1,
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followed by a task-based measure of participants’ ability to disengage from self-focused
thought (Muraven, 2005).
Procedure
All participants completed a picture-based emotion regulation task. Those from
the artist subsample completed this task while undergoing MRI, as the last of a series of
four tasks. The previous three tasks included imitating or opposing facial expressions,
answering mentalizing or non-mentalizing questions about people depicted in
photographs, and recalling positive and negative emotional experiences. The emotion
regulation task consisted of a series of photographs that were meant to induce either
negative emotional states, or fairly neutral ones, each photograph being preceded by an
instruction to either respond naturally (‘Look’), or use cognitive reappraisal to downregulate the amount of negative emotion they experienced (‘Change’). Analogous to
Study 1, the instruction prompts appeared for 2 seconds before each picture, which was
subsequently bordered by a color-coded frame, to serve as a reminder of the instruction.
During the experiment, participants alternated between ‘Look Neutral’, ‘Look Negative’,
and ‘Change Negative’ trials (20 of each type) consisting of the 2-second instruction, the
photograph presented for an 8-second interval, and a question asking for an estimate of
participants’ momentary level of negative affect (“How negative do you feel right now?”)
on an 8-point Likert scale (‘1’=’not at all negative’; ‘8’= ‘extremely negative’).

52

The stimuli were matched using the normative I.A.P.S. ratings (Lang, Bradley, &
Cuthbert, 2008) for valence (1 “unpleasant” to 8 “pleasant”) and arousal (1 “calm” to 8
“excited”). The ‘Look Negative’ and ‘Change Negative’ images were chosen in such a
way that they normatively rated as negative (M=2.37, SD=.68 for ‘Look Negative’;
M=2.41, SD=.72 for ‘Change Negative’) and moderately arousing (M=5.86, SD=1.24 for
‘Look Negative’; M=5.84, SD=1.16 for ‘Change Negative’). The ‘Look Neutral’ images
were chosen in such a way that they normatively rated as neutral (M=4.94, SD=.20) and
low arousing (M=3.49, SD=1.35). Crucially, the ‘Look Negative’ and ‘Change Negative’
images were not significantly different on either valence, t(78)= –.19, p > .849, or
arousal, t(78)= .06, p > .957.
Responses from participants’ who completed this task in the scanner were
collected using a modified scale adapted for collecting responses using an MRIcompatible 4-button box.. The instructions for using the scale stressed that if participants
felt more negative emotion than a ‘1’, but not quite a ‘2’, they should press the ‘1’ button
twice, with the same rule applying for the remaining buttons. Their responses were later
transformed to the same 1 to 8 scale used by participants in the student subsample.
After the emotion regulation task, participants completed a detailed debriefing
questionnaire analogous to that used in Study 1. This started with open-ended questions
about the task instructions participants remembered receiving (‘What were you instructed
to do during the LOOK trials?’, ‘What were you instructed to do during the CHANGE
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trials?). After each open-ended instruction recall question, participants were asked to
provide ratings of how difficult it was to have followed the Look and Change instructions
(‘How difficult was it for you to follow this instruction?, accompanied by a 9-point Likert
scale anchored at ‘1’ = ‘not difficult at all’ and ‘9’ = ‘very difficult’).
The second task of interest measured participant’s ability to flexibly disengage
from self-focused thought. This task was based on a version previously validated by
Muraven and colleagues (2005), in which they asked their participants to answer whether
a series of traits applied to themselves or not (‘Self’) and whether they applied to their
best friend or not (‘Other’). Participants alternated between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ blocks,
consisting of 20 traits each. Within each block, presentations of adjectives (5 seconds)
were interrupted with 6 random presentations of short-duration sounds (1 second) timed
500 milliseconds after the onset of a trait. Participants were instructed that, for trials on
which they heard a sound, they were not to make a decision about the adjective, but
instead press the space bar as soon as they heard the sound. The average reaction time to
the sounds in each block measured participants’ ability to disengage from self-focused
and other-focused thought, respectively.
Finally, participants completed a series of individual difference questionnaires.
Those in the student subsample filled out the questionnaires at the very end of their study
session, whereas those in the artist subsample had already filled out a much larger set of
questionnaires at home, several days before their laboratory appointment. The specific
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individual difference measures collected across subsamples for this study were: emotion
regulation (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003), empathy (Davis, 1983), rumination and reflection
(RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), self-consciousness (SCS-R; Scheier & Carver,
1985), and depression (DSM-V level 1 cross-cutting symptom measure; Narrow et al.,
2013). Each participant’s summary scores on these scales (and relevant subscales) were
used in exploratory analyses in order to gage their association with emotion regulation
success and emotion regulation difficulty.
Data Analysis Approach
Inclusion Criteria. Inclusion criteria for the emotion regulation task were based
on participants’ answers about what they were asked to do for the Look and Change
trials, respectively, from the post-task debriefing questionnaire. Each participant’s
answers to these questions were evaluated for instruction compliance by two independent
raters. There was unanimous agreement between raters that all participants correctly
recalled the instructions corresponding to the Look and Change trials, thus no exclusions
were made based on instruction compliance.
Due to technical difficulties, negative emotion ratings were not collected from 4
participants from the artist subsample (10%) and 1 participant from the student
subsample (2%), thus these participants were excluded across all analyses.
For the self-absorption measure, average reaction times to the sounds in the Self
and Other blocks were computed for each participant who responded to at least three out
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of the six sounds in each block. This criterion resulted in an additional 14 participants
being excluded from the artist subsample (35%), and 8 participants being excluded from
the student subsample (17%).
Together, exclusions resulted in a 45% decrease in the number of participants
from the artist subsample, and a 19% decrease in the number of participants from the
student subsample. All analyses are based on a final number of N=60 participants, out of
which N1=22 were artists and N2=38 were students. Slight deviations from these numbers
in the degrees of freedom for the various analyses employed are due to missing data.
Comparisons Between Subsamples. In order to investigate whether the two
subsamples were similar enough to be combined, or whether the interpretation of
associations based on the combined sample should be qualified by subsample, I
investigated whether any of the primary measures (self-absorption, negative emotion, or
emotion regulation difficulty) were different among the two subsamples. These analysis
procedures are detailed below.
Self-Absorption. In order to determine whether the magnitude of the selfabsorption effect was different in the two subsamples, mean reaction times were
submitted to a repeated measures GLM with Block (Self, Other) as a within-participants
factor and Subsample as a between-participants factor. A main effect of Block was
expected, such that participants would be overall slower to disengage from self-focused
thought compared to other-focused thought. While not necessarily expecting a main
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effect of Subsample, or an interaction between Block and Subsample, I did plan to
follow-up on any significant results or trends in order to inform conclusions about the
association of self-absorption and emotional reactivity, emotion regulation, and emotion
regulation difficulty.
Negative Emotion. Average values for each participant, and each Condition by
Trial Type combination, were computed for self-reported negative affect. As a
manipulation check for having elicited emotional reactivity and emotion regulation
successfully using the picture-based task, and whether the two subsamples could be
combined, these average ratings were submitted to a repeated measures GLM with Trial
Type (Look Neutral, Look Negative, Change Negative) as a within-participants factor
and Subsample (Artist, Student) as a between-participants factor. Significant main effects
and interactions were followed up as necessary, in order to determine whether there were
significant effects of reactivity, regulation, and whether any of these were different in the
two subsamples. While not necessarily expecting a main effect of Subsample, or an
interaction between Trial Type and Subsample, I did plan to follow-up on any significant
results or trends in order to inform conclusions about the association between emotional
reactivity, emotion regulation, and self-absorption.
Emotion Regulation Difficulty. To compare emotion regulation difficulty
between the two subsamples, difficulty ratings were submitted to a repeated measures
GLM with Instruction (Look, Change) as a within-participants factor, and Subsample
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(Artist, Student) as a between-participants factor. While not necessarily expecting a main
effect of Subsample, or an interaction between Instruction and Subsample, I did plan to
follow-up on any significant results or trends in order to inform conclusions about the
association between emotion regulation difficulty and self-absorption.
Self-Absorption and Negative Emotion. In order to examine the effects of selfabsorption on reactivity and regulation, I computed difference scores between the average
RT in the Self and Other blocks (self-absorption), average negative emotion ratings for
the Look Negative and Look Neutral trials (reactivity), and average negative emotion
ratings for the Look Negative and Change Negative trials (regulation), for every
participant. These difference scores were then used as dependent variables in regression
analyses.
Self-Absorption and Emotion Regulation Difficulty. Using a similar logic, in
order to examine the effects of self-absorption on emotion regulation difficulty, I
submitted the difference scores between the average RT in the Self and Other blocks
(self-absorption), and the difference scores between the difficulty ratings for the Look
and Change instruction (emotion regulation difficulty) to a separate regression analysis.
Exploratory Correlations with Individual Differences. After reversing any
negatively-phrased questions, average scores were calculated for each of the following
scales and subscales: frequency of using cognitive reappraisal, expressive suppression,
and situational control in everyday life, as well as frequency of emotion regulation in
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general (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003), empathy (Davis, 1983), rumination and reflection
(RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), private and public self-consciousness (SCS-R;
Scheier & Carver, 1985), as well as depression (DSM-V L1 CCSM; Narrow et al., 2013).
After determining the internal consistency of each scale and subscale, participant’s
summary scores were submitted to exploratory correlational analyses in order to gage
their association with emotion regulation success and emotion regulation difficulty across
the two subsamples, and as necessary, within each subsample.
Hypotheses
I hypothesized that the ability to disengage from self-focused thought, as
measured by self-absorption scores, would be associated with more adaptive emotion
regulation, as evidenced by either higher emotion regulation success, lower emotion
regulation difficulty, or both.
Results
Comparisons Between Subsamples. A detailed account of the comparisons
between subsamples on each of the dependent variables detailed under Data Analysis
Approach appears below.
Self-Absorption. There was a significant main effect of Block, F(1,58)=15.22, p <
.001, such that, across subsamples, participants exhibited slower reaction times when
reacting to the sounds in the Self (M=764.86, SD=190.31) compared to Other
(M=682.19, SD=133.39) blocks. There was also a significant main effect of Subsample,
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F(1,58)=4.44, p < .041, such that participants in the Student subsample had slower
reaction times to the sounds (M=752.07, SD=157.58) than participants in the Artist
subsample (M=674.25, SD=158.70). No significant interaction between Block and
Subsample was observed, F(1,58)=.51, p > .479, indicating that the effect of Block (or
self-absorption effect) was not significantly different between the two subsamples.
Nonetheless, upon visual inspection, it was apparent that a greater proportion of
participants from the student sample (39%) compared to the artist sample (23%) did not
actually show a self-absorption effect, i.e. they were not slower to react to the
interrupting sounds in the Self compared to Other blocks. On the contrary, these
participants were slower to react to the interrupting sounds during the Other blocks
compared to the Self blocks. Although the presence or absence of a self-absorption effect
was not a significant moderator of the relationship between self-absorption and emotion
regulation success or difficulty (p > .18), we explored whether the association between
self-absorption and emotion regulation might have been more apparent in those
participants who showed a self-absorption effect in the first place. The results of these
analyses appear in Appendix A – Supplementary Analyses.
Negative Emotion. There was a significant main effect of Trial Type,
F(2,116)=306.77, p < .001. Thus, there was an overall difference in the amounts of
negative emotion participants felt after the Look Neutral, Change Negative, and Look
Negative trials. Post-hoc paired samples t-tests indicated that there was a significant
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reactivity effect, t(59)= –22.97, p < .001. Across conditions, participants reported feeling
more negative emotion after the Look Negative trials (M=5.65, SD=1.27) than after the
Look Neutral trials (M=1.56, SD=.50). There was also a significant effect of regulation,
t(59)=10.35, p < .001. Across conditions, participants reported feeling significantly less
negative emotion after the Change Negative trials (M=4.18, SD=1.19) than after the Look
Negative trials (M=5.65, SD=1.27). There was no significant effect of Subsample,
F(1,58)=2.38, p > .128, however there was a significant interaction between Trial Type
and Subsample, F(2, 116)=5.75, p < .005, suggesting the effect of Trial Type (Look
Neutral, Change Negative, Look Negative) was different between the two subsamples
(Artist, Student). In order to follow-up on this interaction, I compared the effects of
reactivity (Look Neutral vs. Look Negative) and regulation (Change Negative vs. Look
Negative) between subsamples.
To compare the reactivity effect between subsamples, negative emotion ratings
were submitted to a repeated measures GLM with Trial Type (Look neutral, Look
Negative) as a within-participants factor, and Subsample (Artist, Student) as a betweenparticipants factor. There was a significant Trial Type by Subsample interaction,
F(1,58)=9.96, p < .004, the latter confirming that reactivity was different between the two
subsamples. A comparison of the difference score between negative emotion in the Look
Neutral and Look Negative trials by Subsample indicated that there was a larger amount
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of emotional reactivity in the Student subsample (M=4.49, SD=1.34) than in the Artist
subsample (M=3.41, SD=1.17).
To compare the effect of regulation between the two subsamples, negative
emotion ratings were submitted to a separate repeated measures GLM with Trial Type
(Change Negative, Look Negative) as a within-participants factor, and Subsample (Artist,
Student) as a between-participants factor. There was no significant Trial Type by
Subsample interaction, F(1,58)=2.22, p > .141, indicating that the effect of regulation was
not significantly different between the two subsamples.
Emotion Regulation Difficulty. There was a significant effect of Instruction,
F(1,57)=64.99, p < .001, such that, across subsamples, participants found it more difficult
to follow the Change instruction (M=5.58, SD=1.63) compared to the Look instruction
(M=2.34, SD=1.89). There was no significant main effect of Subsample, F(1,57)=1.57, p
> .215 , and no significant interaction of Instruction and Subsample, F(1,57)=.05, p >
.823. This suggested that emotion regulation difficulty was not different in the two
subsamples.
Self-Absorption and Emotional Reactivity. Across subsamples, there was a
significant negative association between self-absorption and emotional reactivity, r(60)=
–.28, p < .033, such that participants who took longer to disengage from self-focused
thought were less emotionally reactive. Analyses within each subsample indicated a
significant association for the artist subsample, r1(22)= –.45, p < .038, and a non62

significant association for the student subsample, r2(38)= –.16, p > .331. This suggested
that the association between self-absorption and emotional reactivity was driven by the
participants in the artist subsample.
Self-Absorption and Emotion Regulation. Across subsamples, there was a
trending negative association between self-absorption and emotion regulation, r(60)= –
.24, p < .072, such that participants who took longer to disengage from self-focused
thought tended to down-regulate their negative emotion less successfully. Analyses
within each subsample indicated a significant association in the artist subsample, r1(22)=
–.527, p < .013, and a non-significant association in the student subsample , r2(38)= –
.004, p > .983, suggesting that the trending association above was driven by participants
in the artist subsample.
Self-Absorption and Emotion Regulation Difficulty. There was no significant
association between self-absorption and self-reported difficulty following the Change
relative to the Look instruction in the combined sample, r(59)= –.10, p > .435, the artist
sample r1(21)= –.02, p > .929, or the student sample, r2(38)= –.17, p > .320.
Emotion Regulation Difficulty and Emotion Regulation Success. In the
combined sample, there was no significant correlation between emotion regulation
difficulty and success (calculated as difference scores), r(59)= –.10, p > .435. A separate
analysis for each subsample suggested that this association was absent in the artist
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subsample, r1(21)= .03, p > .900. However, there was a trending association in the
student subsample, r2(38)=.30, p < .073.
Exploratory Correlations with Individual Differences. All individual
difference scales and subscales exhibited high internal consistency (Crohnbach’s α > .82
in each instance). Statistics are reported below, separating emotion regulation success and
emotion regulation difficulty. As all analyses were exploratory, p-values have not been
corrected for multiple comparisons, and all significance tests are 2-tailed.
Individual Differences Related to Emotion Regulation Success. Emotion
regulation success scores, calculated as differences between the ratings provided
immediately after the Look Negative and Change Negative trials, were submitted to an
exploratory correlational analysis with the nine individual differences listed above.
Emotion regulation success was correlated with a total of two out of nine individual
differences. Participants who reported more complete down-regulation of negative
emotion during the task also reported significantly greater use of cognitive reappraisal in
everyday life, r(55)=.30, p < .025, as well as being marginally less depressed, r(55)= –
.24, p < .074, although the latter was only a trend.
Individual Differences Related to Emotion Regulation Difficulty. Emotion
regulation difficulty scores, calculated as differences in subjective difficulty ratings when
following the Change and Look instructions, were also submitted to an exploratory
correlational analysis with the same nine individual differences used in the previous
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analysis. Emotion regulation difficulty was correlated with a total of three out of the nine
individual differences. Specifically, participants who reported more difficult emotion
regulation during the task also reported using expressive suppression less in their daily
lives, r(54)= –.27, p < .047, tended to use emotional control less in their daily lives,
r(54)= –.22, p < .106, and were more depressed, r(54)=.31, p < .029.
Individual Differences Related to Self-Absorption. Self-absorption scores,
calculated as differences in reaction time when responding to interrupting sounds in the
Self compared to Other blocks, were also submitted to an exploratory correlational
analysis with the same thirteen individual differences used in the previous analysis. Selfabsorption was only correlated at a trend level with public self-consciousness, r(55)=.23.
p < .084, specifically greater self-absorption tended to be associated with greater public
self-consciousness.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 confirmed that a greater ability to disengage from selffocused thought tends to be associated with greater emotion regulation success, with the
same association being stronger and actually significant when selecting for self-absorbed
participants (see Appendix A). The same ability was also associated with lower emotional
reactivity, although this effect was weaker and did not reach significance when selecting
for self-absorbed participants. Although Study 2 employed a correlational design, the
presence of an association between disengagement of self-focused thought and emotion
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regulation, despite a concurrent association with emotional reactivity, together with the
results of Study 1 (which employed an experimental design), strengthen the conclusion
that emotion regulation can benefit in important ways from disengagement of selffocused thought.
Interestingly, while Study 1 found that disengaging self-focused cognition (using
other-focused cognition) had robust effects on emotion regulation difficulty, but not
success, Study 2 found that disengaging self-focused cognition was associated with
emotion regulation success, but not difficulty. Nonetheless, similar to Study 1, emotion
regulation difficulty and emotion regulation success were not significantly correlated
with one another in Study 2.
Because the Study 1 and Study 2 relied on different methods of emotion
elicitation, with Study 1 using films, and Study 2 using pictures, there may be reason to
believe that the precise association between emotion regulation success and difficulty
may depend on the nature of the emotion elicitation. Specifically, it is possible that, for
the task used in Study 1, there was less variability in emotion regulation success and
more variability in emotion regulation difficulty, whereas in Study 2 this may have been
reversed. Performing a face-level comparison between the two tasks: in Study 1
participants had more time to reappraise, i.e. 2 minutes and 40 seconds compared to 10
seconds, they had only one stimulus to reappraise rather than 20, and had to engage in the
task for only 12 minutes compared to 20 minutes. Furthermore, in Study 2, about half of
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the participants (Artist subsample) engaged in the emotion regulation task after having
completed 4 other tasks, and these same participants exhibited a stronger negative
association between self-absorption and emotion regulation success (despite a concurrent
negative association with emotional reactivity). With these differences in mind, it is
interesting to note that, in a study in which emotion regulation may have been more
challenging, may have inadvertently been operating under mental fatigue, and after which
participants actually reported greater emotion regulation difficulty (Study 2), there was an
association between disengaging self-focused cognition and emotion regulation success.
Overall, converging evidence from two studies using different measures of
emotion elicitation, with a different operationalization of disengaging self-focused
cognition, and in slightly different populations, suggests that disengagement of selffocused thought improves emotion regulation outcomes. Specifically, in the Study 1,
disengagement of self-focused thought resulted in comparable emotion regulation success
that was achieved with less difficulty or effort, while in Study 2 disengagement of selffocused thought resulted in greater emotion regulation success that was achieved with
comparable difficulty.
More broadly, the fact that measures of emotion regulation difficulty and emotion
regulation success were not correlated in either Study 1 or Study 2, but were
differentially predicted by self-absorption at different levels of task difficulty, indicates
that emotion regulation difficulty should not be thought of as completely inconsequential
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with respect to emotion regulation success. The idea of a tradeoff between success and
difficulty of emotion regulation is hardly a new one (see Mauss & Gross, 2007), and this
tradeoff has lead researchers to control for difficulty when comparing the success of
different emotion regulation strategies (e.g. McRae et al., 2010). These first two studies
further highlight the idea that there is important information to be gained about emotion
regulation as a process, that may not be captured by either success or difficulty in absence
of one another.
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Chapter Five: Study 3
The purpose of this study was two-fold: 1) establishing whether there might be a
causal link between an increase in self-focused thought and emotion regulation outcomes,
and 2) testing whether disengagement of self-focused thought was necessary in order to
improve either the success or difficulty of emotion regulation, or whether changing the
content of self-focused thought might be sufficient to alleviate some of the detrimental
effects of self-focused thought on emotion regulation.
Before completing the emotion regulation task, participants completed a selfreflection task, for which they were randomly assigned to one of three priming
conditions: an ‘Individuation’ condition in which they reflected on aspects of themselves
as unique and different from others, a ‘Deindividuation’ condition in which they reflected
on aspects of themselves as similar to others, or a ‘Control’ condition in which selfthought was not interfered with.
I predicted that engaging in self-reflection before the emotion regulation task
would result in less successful and/or more difficult emotion regulation compared to the
control condition. However, if changing the content of self-thought before engaging in
emotion regulation was sufficient to influence its outcomes, participants in the
Deindividuation condition should experience down-regulation of negative emotion that is
more successful and/or less difficult, compared to participants in the Individuation
condition. If, however, changing the content of self-thought was insufficient in order to
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influence emotion regulation success or difficulty, there should be no differences on these
measures between participants in the Deindividuation and Individuation conditions.
Participants and Design
The experiment used a 3 x 3 Repeated-Measures design with Condition
(Individuation, Deindividuation, Control) varied between-participants, and Trial Type
(Look Neutral, Look Negative, Change Negative) varied within-participants. For the
between factor, participants were randomly assigned to complete a picture-based emotion
regulation task either under a state of increased focus on unique qualities of themselves
(Individuation), increased focus on themselves as similar to others (Deindividuation), or a
Control condition in which self-focus was not manipulated.
The study in its entirety took place online and relied on an initial sample of 278
participants. Out of these, 200 participants were recruited using the Amazon Mechanical
Turk platform and were compensated $4.50 for their participation, while the other 78
participants were recruited from the University of Denver and were compensated with
extra credit towards a psychology course of their choosing.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted using Qualtrics software, which facilitates the
collection of a variety of self-report data online, and allows controlled timing of stimulus
presentation, as well as random assignment to conditions. Participants ostensibly signed
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up for a study about “Personality and Emotion”. Informed consent as well as all study
manipulations and measures were administered online.
The situational manipulation of self-reflection took place at the start of the
experiment, after consent and immediately before the emotion regulation task. This
manipulation was achieved using a previously validated writing task, adapted from Silvia
and Eichstaedt (2004). Participants were asked to either list ways in which they are
unique and different from their family, friends, and other people in general
(Individuation), list ways in which they are alike or similar to their family, friends, and
other people in general (Deindividuation), or respond to questions that shouldn’t have
been self-focusing at all, namely write about a humanities class they recently took, a
science class, and the last time they went out to eat (Control). Participants had 6 minutes
to perform this writing task and they were instructed to answer all 3 questions using at
least 5000 characters. In order to validate the manipulation, after excluding any nonresponses, I compared the total number of first-person singular pronouns participants
used in their writing in each condition, with the expectation of a linearly decreasing trend
between the Individuation, Deindividuation, and Control condition.
After the situational self-focus manipulation, participants were given instructions
for and completed a picture-based emotion regulation task. During this task, they saw a
series of photographs that had previously been validated to induce either a negative, or
fairly neutral emotional state, while following prompts to either respond naturally
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(‘Look’), or use cognitive reappraisal to down-regulate their negative emotion
(‘Change’). Before starting this task, participants went through a brief training, using
detailed instructions and examples as to what they should do for each prompt. During the
task, prompts appeared for 2 seconds before each photo. In addition, each photo was
bordered by a color-coded frame, which served as a reminder of the prompt. The ‘Look’
prompt was paired with both negative and neutral photos, whereas the ‘Change’ prompt
was only paired with negative photos. During the experiment, participants alternated
between ‘Look Neutral’, ‘Look Negative’, and ‘Change Negative’ trials (15 for each
type), presented for 10 seconds each, and afterwards estimated their momentary level of
negative affect (“How negative do you feel right now?”) on a 10-point Likert scale
(‘0’=’not at all negative’; ‘9’= ‘extremely negative’).
Similar to Study 2, The stimuli were matched using the normative I.A.P.S. ratings
(Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) for valence (1 “unpleasant” to 8 “pleasant”) and
arousal (1 “calm” to 8 “excited”). The ‘Look Negative’ and ‘Change Negative’ images
were chosen in such a way that they normatively rated as negative (M=2.33, SD=.41 for
‘Look Negative’; M=2.23, SD=.33 for ‘Change Negative’) and moderately arousing
(M=5.73, SD=.72 for ‘Look Negative’; M=5.73, SD=.71 for ‘Change Negative’). The
‘Look Neutral’ images were chosen in such a way that they normatively rated as neutral
(M=4.95, SD=.21) and low arousing (M=2.86, SD=.39). The ‘Look Negative’ and
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‘Change Negative’ images were not significantly different on either valence, t(30)= .75, p
> .458, or arousal, t(30)= –.01, p > .994.
After the emotion regulation task, participants completed two measures of selffocused thought, which served as manipulation checks. The first measure was a sentence
completion task modeled after Wegner and Giuliano (1980), which is displayed in Figure
8. This task involved completing a series of five sentences with the one of three pronouns
that were provided, one of which was a first person singular pronoun. The second
measure was a self-report questionnaire developed by Govern and Marsch (2001), which
specifically asked participants about their current attention to private aspects of
themselves, their attention to public aspects of themselves, and their attention to the
environment.
At the end of the study, participants again filled out a detailed debriefing
questionnaire. This included open-ended questions about instruction compliance (e.g.
“What were you instructed to do during the ‘Look’ trials?”; “What were you instructed to
do during the ‘Change’ trials?”), as well as pointed questions about task difficulty (“How
difficult was it for you to carry out the ‘Look’ instruction?”; “How difficult was it for you
to carry out the ‘Change’ instruction?”), using a 10-point Likert scale (‘0’=’not at all
difficult’; ‘9’= ‘extremely difficult’). This was followed with a series of individual
difference questionnaires which included: emotion regulation in daily life (ERQ; Gross &
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John, 2003), rumination and reflection (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), and selfconsciousness (SCS-R; Scheier & Carver, 1985).
Data Analysis Approach
Inclusion Criteria. Because the study was conducted online, a set of predefined
inclusion criteria were used to ensure that participants in the final sample performed the
tasks the way they were intended. A total of 7 ‘catch’ questions were interspersed
throughout the questionnaire sections of the study in order to determine whether
participants were engaged in the study and not mindlessly progressing through the study
procedures in order to receive compensation. These questions specifically instructed
participants to pick a particular response on the scale provided, e.g. “For this particular
item, pick the rightmost response option on the scale”. Additional inclusion criteria were
set based on adherence to instructions for the Self-Reflection and Emotion Regulation
tasks, which are detailed below.
Self-Reflection Task. Participants who did not answer one or more of the three
questions for their respective condition in a satisfactory manner were excluded from the
final sample. Examples included participants who either did not answer the questions at
all, seemingly answered different questions, or inserted spaces and/or other fillers to
reach the 5000-character minimum.
Emotion Regulation Task. Participants had to answer two open-ended questions
about the instructions they had followed during the emotion regulation task (‘What were
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you instructed to do during the CHANGE trials?’; ‘What were you instructed to do
during the LOOK trials?’). Their answers to these two questions were coded by
independent raters to determine whether there was sufficient separation between the
‘Look’ and ‘Change’ conditions. Participants for whom this separation was not clear, e.g.
they reported trying to change how they were feeling during ‘Look’ trials, or indicated
they did not recall the instructions, were to be removed from the final sample.
Manipulation Checks. Data from three separate tasks were used in order to
determine whether the amount of self-focused thought participants exhibited was
different based on their assigned condition for the Self-Reflection task. The analysis
approach for each of these is detailed below. Specifically, the manipulation checks
included the number of first person pronouns participants used during the Self-Reflection
Task (before the Emotion Regulation Task), the number of first person pronouns
participants used on a Sentence Completion Task (administered after the Emotion
Regulation Task), and the scores obtained from participants’ answers to the Situational
Self-Awareness Questionnaire administered immediately after the Sentence Completion
Task, with the expectation that all of these would show differentiation based on the
Individuation, Deindividuation, and Control conditions. These expectations are consistent
with documented effects of individuation and deindividuation priming on self-awareness
(Diener, 1979; Phemister & Crewe, 2004; Silvia & Eichstaedt, 2004; Wicklund, 1975), as
well as the effects of self-awareness on the subsequent use of first person pronouns and
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vice-versa (Davis & Brock, 1975; Schaller, 1979; Silvia & Eichstaedt, 2004; Wegner &
Giuliano, 1980).
Number of First Person Pronouns used in Self-Reflection Task. The number of
first-person pronouns participants used in their answers to the self-reflection questions
was submitted to a simple GLM with Condition as an independent variable. A significant
effect of Condition was expected, such that participants in the Individuation condition
would use the greatest number of first person singular pronouns, followed by participants
in the Deindividuation condition, and the participants in the Control condition. I expected
all pairwise comparisons between conditions to be significant.
Number of First Person Pronouns used in Sentence Completion Task. The
number of first-person singular pronouns that each participant used for sentence
completion was submitted to a simple GLM with Condition as an independent variable. A
significant effect of Condition analogous to the one for the initial manipulation check was
expected, with participants in the Individuation condition using the greatest number of
first person singular pronouns, followed by participants in the Deindividuation and
Control condition, respectively, and all pairwise comparisons between conditions
significant.
Situational Self-Awareness Scores. After reversing negatively-phrased questions,
each participant’s answers to the questions from the Situational Self-Awareness Scale
were averaged to produce two separate self-awareness scores: private self-awareness, and
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public self-awareness. Internal consistency was computed for each of these subscales
using Crohnbach’s α procedure. A significant effect of Condition analogous to the one
for the initial manipulation check was expected for private self-awareness, with
participants in the Individuation condition being most self-aware, followed by
participants in the Deindividuation and Control condition, respectively, and all pairwise
comparisons between conditions significant. No differences between the three conditions
were expected for public self-awareness.
Negative Emotion Ratings. Average values for each participant, and each
Condition X Trial Type combination, were submitted to a repeated measures general
linear model. Condition was manipulated between participants, thereby applying to each
of the ‘Look Neutral’, ‘Look Negative’, and ‘Change Negative’ trials. Therefore, I
examined both main effects of these manipulations, and interactions that would indicate
the manipulations have differential impact in the context of reactivity (‘Look Negative’
vs. ‘Look Neutral’ contrast for each condition) and regulation (‘Change Negative’ vs.
‘Look Negative’ contrast for each condition).
Difficulty Ratings. Difficulty ratings were collected once per Instruction at the
end of the experiment. These ratings were submitted to a simple GLM with Instruction
(Look, Change) as a within-participants factor, and Condition (Individuation,
Deindividuation, Control) as a between-participants factor. Using the same logic as the
analyses for negative emotion and general arousal ratings, I examined main effects of the
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experimental manipulation, as well as interactions indicating that the manipulation had a
different impact in the context of reactivity (‘Look’ instruction) and regulation (‘Change’
instruction).
Hypotheses
With respect to emotion regulation success, I hypothesized that participants in the
Individuation condition would experience less emotion regulation success than
participants in the Deindividuation and Control conditions. Specifically, I predicted a
Trial Type and Condition interaction, such that differences in negative emotion between
the Look Negative and Change Negative trials would be smaller in the Individuation
condition, compared to both the Deindividuation and Control conditions.
With respect to emotion regulation difficulty, I predicted that reappraisal in the
Deindividuation and Control conditions would be perceived as less difficult than
reappraisal in the Individuation condition. Specifically, I predicted an Instruction by
Condition interaction, such that differences in difficulty between the Look and Change
instruction would be smaller in the Deindividuation and Control conditions, compared to
the Individuation condition.
Results
Inclusion Criteria. A total of 40 out of the initial 278 participants failed the
‘catch’ questions, by either not answering one or all of the questions, or not answering
them correctly, and were excluded from the final sample. Of the remaining 238, another 8
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participants were excluded for failing to complete the Self-Reflection task in a
satisfactory manner, i.e. not writing anything at all, or their answers not matching the
questions they had been asked. Finally, 16 participants were excluded based on the
independent rater’s estimate of not having adhered to the Look and Change instructions
during the emotion regulation task, i.e. not recalling what they were instructed to do,
reappraising during “Look” trials, or not reappraising during ‘Change’ trials.
The final sample included N=214 participants, out of which N1=164 were from
the Mechanical Turk sample, and N2=50 were students. Because of the steep difference in
the number of participants from each subsample, and the uneven distribution of
participants to condition for the student subsample, all analyses were only performed on
the combined dataset with 214 participants. The final numbers of participants in each
condition were: 74 for the Individuation condition, 78 for the Deindividuation condition,
and 62 for the Control condition. Any deviations from these numbers would be due to
missing data, and any fractional degrees of freedom in F-tests denote Greenhouse-Geisser
adjustments for differences in error variance, as suggested by a significant Mauchly’s
sphericity test.
Manipulation Checks. For the Self-Reflection Task, there was a significant
effect of Condition on the number of first-person singular pronouns participants used in
the self-reflection task, F(2,211)=49.10, p < .001, suggesting that there were significant
differences between conditions in the amount of self-focused thought participants
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engaged in. Participants in the Individuation condition used more first-person singular
pronouns, t(151)=7.50, p < .001, than participants in the Deindividuation condition, who
in turn also used more first-person singular pronouns than participants in the Control
condition, t(139)=2.26, p < .026. This suggests that, at least initially, the self-reflection
manipulation was successful.
For the Sentence Completion Task, there was no significant effect of Condition
on the number of first-person singular pronouns each participant used for the sentence
completion task, F(2,211)=.52, p > .595, and none of the pairwise comparisons between
the three conditions were significant (p > .327 for each). This suggests that any effects of
self-reflection on the amount of self-focused thought participants engaged in had
dissipated by the end of the emotion regulation task.
On the Situational Self-Awareness Questionnaire, there was no significant effect
of Condition on private self-awareness, F(2,211)=.20, p > .821, or public self-awareness,
F(2,211)=1.94, p > .146. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons indicated only a marginallysignificant difference in public self-awareness between the Deindividuation and Control
condition, t(139)=1.96, p < .052, such that participants in the Deindividuation condition
reported higher public self-awareness (M=3.21, SD=1.66) than participants in the Control
condition (M=2.69, SD=1.43). This suggests that only Deindividuation had an effect on
situational self-awareness that persisted until the end of the emotion regulation task, and
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this effect was an increase in the amount of public self-focused thought, or an awareness
of how an individual appears to others.
Negative Emotion Ratings. Only a significant main effect of Trial Type was
present, F(1.80, 380.68)=1410.37, p < .001. Across conditions, participants reported
different amounts of negative emotion after Look Neutral trials, Change Negative trials,
and Look Negative trials. This main effect included a significant reactivity effect, t(213)=
–46.38, p < .001, such that participants reported feeling more negative emotion after the
Look Negative trials (M=7.15, SD=1.65) compared to the Look Neutral trials (M=1.67,
SD=.96). There was also a significant effect of regulation, t(213)=9.37, p < .001, as
participants reported feeling less negative emotion after the Change Negative trials (M=6.
30, SD=1.76) compared to the Look Negative trials (M=7.15, SD=1.65).
There was no significant effect of Condition, F(2,211)=.89, p > .414, meaning
there were no overall effects of this manipulation on the amount of negative emotion
participants felt across conditions. There was also no significant interaction between Trial
Type and Condition, F(3.61,380.68)=.60, p > .646, meaning there were no differences in
the effects of Trial Type between conditions. Thus, there was no evidence that changing
the content of self-focused thought influenced emotion regulation success.
Emotion Regulation Difficulty. There was a significant main effect of
Instruction on participants’ difficulty ratings, F(1,211)=493.56, p < .001. Across
conditions, participants reported experiencing significantly more difficulty carrying out
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the Change instruction (M=6.62, SD=2.17) compared to the Look instruction (M=2.37,
SD=2.10). There was no significant main effect of Condition, F(2,211)=.91, p > .405,
thus no were no overall effects of the manipulation on the amount of difficulty
participants experienced across instruction. There was no significant interaction between
Instruction and Condition, F(2,211)=.33, p > .718, thus no evidence that changing the
content of self-focused thought had any effect on emotion regulation difficulty.
Exploratory Analyses Using Subjective Ratings of Self-Focused Thought.
There was no consistent effect of the experimental manipulation of self-focused thought
on emotion regulation success or difficulty, thus there was no evidence that changing the
content of self-focused thought influences emotion regulation outcomes. However, there
were also no consistent differences in the content of self-focused thought after the
emotion regulation task, suggesting that any effects of the manipulation had dissipated at
that time.
Fortunately, measures of the amount of self-focused thought people experienced
during the experiment (situational self-awareness) as well as on a regular basis in their
everyday lives (trait self-consciousness) were available, and the study was well-powered
enough to explore whether, independently of experimental manipulations, the amount of
self-focused thought that participants reported engaging in (situational or trait-level) was
associated with emotion regulation success or emotion regulation difficulty. Results of
these exploratory correlation analyses are reported below.
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Situational Self-Awareness and Emotion Regulation. There were marginallysignificant associations between emotion regulation success (Look Negative – Change
Negative) and both private self-awareness and, r(214)=.13, p < .052, and public selfawareness, r(214)=.13, p < .055. Participants high on private self-awareness experienced
more negative emotion after ‘Change Negative’ trials, r(214)=.20, p < .004, and after
‘Look Negative’ trials, r(214)=.32, p < .001. Participants high on public self-awareness in
turn did not experience either more or less negative emotion after ‘Change Negative’
trials, r(214)= –.01, p > .874, or after ‘Look Negative’ trials, r(214)=.09, p > .169.
Higher levels of private self-awareness were in turn associated with significantly
greater emotion regulation difficulty (Change - Look), r(214)=.22, p < .002. The source
of this latter association was a correlation between private self-awareness and difficulty
carrying out the ‘Change’ instruction, r(214)=.29, p < .001, but not the ‘Look’
instruction, r(214)= –.01, p > .990. Higher levels of public self-awareness were in turn
not associated with emotion regulation difficulty, r(214)=.08, p > .265
Trait Self-Consciousness and Emotion Regulation. There were no significant
associations between emotion regulation success (Look Negative – Change Negative) and
either private self-consciousness, r(214)= –.07, p > .285, or public self-consciousness,
r(214)= –.02, p > .769, suggesting that elevated levels of self-focused thought in general
in everyday life were unrelated to greater success of emotion regulation on the task.
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Greater emotion regulation difficulty (Change - Look) was associated with higher
levels of private self-consciousness, r(214)=.18, p < .010. The source of this association
was a significant correlation between private self-consciousness and difficulty carrying
out the ‘Change’ instruction, r(214)=.17, p < .013, but not the ‘Look’ instruction, r(214)=
–.06, p > .396. Greater emotion regulation difficulty was also associated with higher
levels of public self-consciousness, r(214)=.16, p < .017. The source of this association
was a significant positive correlation between public self-consciousness and difficulty
carrying out the ‘Change’ instruction, r(214)=.15, p < .035, but no correlation between
public self-consciousness and difficulty carrying out the ‘Look’ instruction, r(214)= –.05,
p > .478.
Other Individual Differences Associated with Emotion Regulation. Of the
remaining six individual differences participants reported on, emotion regulation success
was negatively associated with self-reflection, r(214)= –.16, p < .025, such that
participants who reflected about themselves more often experienced less success on the
emotion regulation task. Emotion regulation difficulty, in turn, tended to be associated
with greater use of situational control in daily life, r(214)=.12, p < .085, and lesser use of
expressive suppression in daily life, r(214)= –.12, p < .085, such that participants who
employed situational control more often, and those who employed expressive suppression
less often, found it more difficult to regulate their emotion on the task. Emotion
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regulation success and emotion regulation difficulty were once again not significantly
correlated with one another, r(214)=.02, p > .784.
Discussion
In the absence of any effects of the manipulation on the amount of self-focused
thought participants engaged in after the emotion regulation task, causal effects of either
the amount or the content of self-focused thought on emotion regulation could not be
established. Nonetheless, exploratory analyses uncovered that levels of self-focused
thought in the moment (situational self-awareness) as well as in general (trait selfconsciousness) were both associated with emotion regulation difficulty. Specifically,
greater amounts of self-focused thought were associated with greater emotion regulation
difficulty. This is a novel result, in so far as these individual differences have yet to be
related to aspects of emotion regulation in a paradigm that controls for emotional
reactivity. Furthermore, their association with emotion regulation difficulty has not been
investigated before.
Together with results from the previous two studies, the present study adds
converging evidence to support the notion that self-focused cognition does have
important consequences for emotion regulation outcomes. Specifically, increased levels
of self-focused thought are associated with increased emotion regulation difficulty (Study
3), while disengaging from self-focused thought may either decrease emotion regulation
difficulty (Study 1) or increases emotion regulation success (Study 2).
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This last study also revealed that emotion regulation difficulty was more strongly
associated with private rather than public self-awareness, suggesting that a self-focus
manipulation that involves placing a mirror in front of the participant (Carver & Scheier,
1978) might be particularly useful for testing whether there is a causal effect of private
self-awareness on emotion regulation difficulty. This manipulation also has the advantage
of having continuous effects throughout the task that it is employed for, making it less
likely for effects to dissipate by the end of a lengthy task. Such an experiment would help
exclude the alternative explanation whereby experiencing difficulty when regulating
emotion leads to an increase in self-focused thought.
Emotion regulation success and difficulty in this study were again not related to
one another, and exhibited different patterns of correlations with individual differences.
These results mirrored those of Study 1 and Study 2 and provided further confirmation
that, in addition to success, difficulty is an important dimension to consider with respect
to emotion regulation (Gruber, Harvey, & Gross, 2012; Mauss & Gross, 2007). One
detail that is worth mentioning from Study 2, provides an interesting clue about the way
that self-focused thought, emotion regulation success, and emotion regulation difficulty
co-vary. Namely, in the student subsample, where emotion regulation success and
emotion regulation difficulty were marginally related to one another, there was no
association between either of the two measures and engagement or disengagement from
self-focused thought.
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Finally, one result from the exploratory individual difference analyses is
particularly intriguing. While one might expect that participants who report using
situational control more often in daily life do so because they have difficulty regulating
emotion in general, which is in turn reflected in difficulty on the emotion regulation task.
Several authors have proposed that emotion regulation frequency in daily life is related to
emotion regulation success on laboratory tasks (see McRae, 2013). However, it is not
clear why engaging in expressive suppression more often would be associated with less
difficult emotion regulation on a task where participants are asked to use cognitive
reappraisal. Studies typically find a positive association between expressive suppression
in daily life and reappraisal difficulty in the lab (e.g. Che, Luo, Tong, et al., 2015). This
correlation might lead one to suspect that participants used expressive suppression on the
task, even though they were not instructed to (see McRae et al., 2010). However, when
carefully scrutinizing participants’ descriptions for strategies they employed to regulate
their emotion, there was no evidence that any of the participants had spontaneously used
this technique.
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Chapter Six: General Discussion
Early studies implied that self-focused cognition may have important
consequences for emotional responding (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Scheier & Carver,
1983; Scheier, Carver, & Gibbons, 1979). Most of these studies had suggested that selffocused cognition affects emotional reactivity, however, the measures of emotion they
employed did used a global measure of emotion without distinguishing between
reactivity and regulation. Thus, it remained unclear whether self-focused cognition
influenced mechanisms of emotional reactivity, emotion regulation, or both. Cognitive
reappraisal may be uniquely suited to support a manipulation involving a non-self
perspective, without changing the intrinsic nature of the self-regulatory process. This
permitted a causal probing of the association between self-focused cognition and emotion
regulation outcomes, independently of emotional reactivity (Study 1).
Seeing how emotion regulation contributes a great deal to personal and
interpersonal well-being (Gross & John, 2003, McRae et al., 2012), if indeed disengaging
self-focused cognition could be flexibly manipulated in order to increase the success of
emotion regulation, or decrease its difficulty, this information would have direct
applicable value for emotion regulation and related fields. There may also be additional
implications of this effect, beyond the emotional domain. In other words, there may be
other self-regulatory processes that could stand to benefit from a non-self perspective in
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adaptive ways, such as negotiation (see Mnookin & Susskind, 1999) or decision-making
(see Vohs, Baumeister, Schmeichel et al., 2014).
Together, the three studies in this dissertation provided converging evidence that,
largely independent of emotional reactivity, relying on self-focused cognition may have
several important consequences for the outcomes of emotion regulation. Specifically, the
use of self-focused cognition during cognitive reappraisal may lead to more difficult
emotion regulation, without increasing its success (Study 1), an inability to disengage
from self-focused thought may be associated with less successful emotion regulation in
the absence of any effects on difficulty (Study 2), whereas momentary self-focused
thought, as well as a general propensity to engage in self-focused, thought may be
associated with more difficult emotion regulation (Study 3).
Furthermore, the same studies help establish that measures of emotion regulation
difficulty and emotion regulation success may be significantly related to one another
(Study 2), this is not always the case (Studies 1, 2, & 3). Interestingly, the relative
amount of emotion regulation difficulty reported in each task and the presence or absence
of an association between success and difficulty, seem to have facilitated the detection of
different patterns of associations between success, difficulty, and self-awareness, as well
as correlations with individual differences (Studies 1-3). This lends continued support to
the notion that, in addition to success, difficulty is an important way of characterizing
emotion regulation. The previous literature has continued to suggest that emotion
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regulation in general and cognitive reappraisal in particular are difficult processes, which
tend to show mental fatigue effects on subsequent self-regulation tasks (see Wagner &
Heatherton, 2013). Vice-versa, studies have revealed that mental fatigue impairs emotion
regulation (e.g. Grillon et al., 2015). In contrast, very few studies seem to have focused
on comparing the amount of difficulty that characterizes different emotion regulation
strategies (Mauss, Bunge & Gross, 2007; Gruber, Harvey, & Gross, 2012). This may
reflect a true gap in the literature, however it is also possible it merely reflects the “filedrawer problem”, whereby null results are not represented in the published literature
(Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014). In either case, the data from the present set of
studies adds to this incipient literature, and at the same time advocates for the utility of
including measures of difficulty and measures of mental fatigue in studies that seek to
compare emotion regulation strategies, rather than limiting comparisons to emotion
regulation success.
Possible Mechanisms
This dissertation as a whole made important strides in establishing the existence
and nature of effects of self-focused cognition on emotion regulation, and the boundary
conditions of these effects. However, there is an important question that remains
unanswered, and that is how does self-focused cognition exert its influence on emotion
regulation outcomes? Below, I will outline three possible mechanisms: one that suggests
self-focused thought adds cognitive load in the reappraisal process, one that suggests that
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self-focused cognition leads to increased emotional reactivity, and one that suggests selffocused cognition causes participants to forget the task at hand and ruminate about the
initial appraisal.
Before moving on to discussing how self-focused thought might influence
reappraisal, it is important to clarify whether the effects of other-focused cognition are
likely to be due to other-focus providing a way to disengage self-focused cognition, or
whether other-focused cognition may have benefits independently of helping disengage
self-focused cognition. In this dissertation, I argue that the former theory is correct. The
data from Studies 2 and 3 provide some important clues towards this.
One inconsistency that should be explored further is that between self-focused
cognition and emotion regulation success. In Study 2, disengagement of self-focused
cognition was associated with greater emotion regulation success, however, in Study 3,
stronger engagement in self-focused cognition was associated with marginally more
successful emotion regulation. While this result stands out as different from the other two
studies, the idea that self-focused cognition is beneficial for goal attainment is wellrepresented in the broader self-regulation literature, and is thought to be mediated by an
increased salience of goal states in working memory (Carver & Scheier, 1988). This
raises an interesting possibility with respect to the mechanism behind effects of selffocused cognition on emotion regulation. Could goal salience be simultaneously
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responsible for increasing emotion regulation success and increasing emotion regulation
difficulty, when the goal has to do with one’s own emotional state?
Regulating one’s own emotion may be very different from self-regulation in
general, which is typically used to refer to regulation of goal-directed behavior. Most
notably, intentionally using cognitive reappraisal to down-regulate negative emotion
presents a self-deception paradox (Greenwald, 1997). In order to change the emotion, one
tries to replace the initial appraisal about a stimulus or situation with a new appraisal, and
forget this initial appraisal. Self-focused thought might make one particularly aware of
this initial appraisal (Silvia, 2002), and in turn create a situation in which, because one is
aware of the deception before it’s been attempted, additional effort is necessary in order
to convince oneself that the old appraisal is not correct, adding cognitive load as one
generates new appraisals. Generating reappraisals with a focus on another person, in turn,
might result in suspending this initial appraisal from working memory, which in turn
would allow participants to generate new appraisals without additional cognitive load,
resulting in an experience of less difficulty. This could also facilitate self-deception
overall, as the reappraisal would seem more believable to the person, in absence of their
own initial appraisal acting as a constant reminder of the deception.
One specific way future studies could test this cognitive load mechanism is by
comparing the effects of self-focused and other-focused cognitive reappraisal with and
without extraneous cognitive load. If self-focused reappraisal is already functioning
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under cognitive load from keeping the initial appraisal in mind, then replacing that with
another form of cognitive load should have no effect on the outcome of emotion
regulation. A previous study by Richards and Gross (2000) suggests that this may be true.
However, adding the same amount of cognitive load to other-focused reappraisal should
in turn increase the difficulty of emotion regulation in this condition, and close the
difficulty gap between self-focused and other-focused reappraisal.
Although the data from neither of the three studies presented here provide direct
evidence for a cognitive load mechanism, they do help exclude the two competing
mechanisms mentioned above. The first of these mechanisms is the one whereby selffocused thought, via increased awareness of the initial appraisal, acts to increase the
intensity of emotional experience, while regulatory processes, which also rely on the self,
act to decrease it, resulting in the experience of more difficulty compared to a case where
regulation is outsourced to other-focused cognition. This could have been a viable
mechanism if there was conclusive evidence that self-focused cognition increases
emotional reactivity simultaneous to a decrease in emotion regulation. However, in Study
1 there was no observable causal relationship between self-focused thought and
emotional reactivity, whereas in Study 2 there was evidence to the contrary: that an
inability to disengage from self-focused thought was associated with decreased emotional
reactivity. Thus, in so far as the present studies are concerned, there is no evidence for
this mechanism.
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The data from the present set of studies also help exclude the third possible
mechanism mentioned above, originally proposed in the self-distancing literature (Kross,
Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005), which maintains that self-focused cognition predisposes
participants to rumination, and self-distancing prevents or reduces a tendency to ruminate
(Kross et al., 2009; Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Kross & Ayduk, 2009). While this literature
presents valid evidence to make a case for a rumination mechanism, the procedure used
for emotion elicitation in this case involves autobiographic recall of emotional
experiences. The procedures used for emotion elicitation in the studies included in this
dissertation do not involve autobiographic recall, and data from neither of the three
studies support the assertion that rumination is significantly associated with emotion
regulation success or emotion regulation difficulty. Rather, individual differences in
reflection, but not rumination, were negatively associated with emotion regulation
success in Study 2. This suggests that, although rumination may have an effect on
emotion regulation, it is not a necessary mediator for the effects of self-focused cognition
on emotion regulation.
Limitations
Although results of the present set of studies are encouraging, they each have
important limitations. In Study 1, the order of the Look Neutral, Look Negative, and
Change Negative trials, and which film stimuli they were each paired with was not
counterbalanced. This choice was made for two reasons. The first one was to ensure
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comparability between conditions for the emotion regulation effect, by having each
participant employ cognitive reappraisal for the same film. The second reason was related
to the practicalities of obtaining a sensitive measure of mental fatigue, by ensuring that
the handgrip endurance test took place immediately after the regulation trial. The latter
made it necessary for this regulation trial to be at the end of the trial sequence. Although
film stimuli are generally considered more ecologically valid than picture stimuli (Ray,
2007), future studies should ensure that conclusions about emotion regulation in general
are not limited by the order of regulation and non-regulation trials across tasks, or
idiosyncrasies in the stimuli used for emotion elicitation and emotion regulation.
Study 2 was limited by the use of two arguably very different convenience
samples (professional artists, and college students) that were combined in order to
maximize power. Even though the same tasks were performed by all participants, in
roughly the same order, the contexts in which participants from the two samples
completed the study were very different. Participant recruitment for the two subsamples
was different, with artists having to fulfill very stringent criteria to qualify for the study,
including MRI compatibility. This may have contributed to a selection bias whereby the
most motivated and conscientious volunteers, who were willing to go through all of the
screening procedures, ended up being invited to participate in the study. The
experimental context was also very different between the two subsamples - artists
completed the procedures relevant to Study 2 at the end of a 2-hours and 30-minutes
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battery of questionnaires and tasks, which included 1 hour of MRI scanning. This may
have inadvertently resulted in mental fatigue, in the absence of which there may not have
been as strong an effect of self-absorption on emotion regulation success (see McRae et
al., 2010). Indeed, this aforementioned effect was weaker in the student subsample.
The decision to add the second subsample was made after analyzing the data
obtained from the artist subsample, where, despite significant effects in the hypothesized
direction, a great number of participants had to be excluded due to unanticipated missing
data on the self-absorption task. Even though a total of 12 sounds were played throughout
the task, some participants reacted to less than half of the sounds, and some volunteered
that they had not heard most of the sounds. For these participants, the validity of any selfabsorption scores obtained was questionable. Even though the decision to exclude these
participants from analyses was made a priori, it did result in a smaller than anticipated
sample size. This problem was not present for the student participants, most of which
were able to hear and react to most of the sounds. However, a large number students had
negative self-absorption scores, which were difficult to interpret the context of the study
hypothesis, and lead to a decision to run exploratory analyses selecting for the overall
presence or absence of a self-absorption effect (although it did not emerge as a significant
moderator of the relationship between self-absorption and either emotion regulation
success or difficulty). The aforementioned negative self-absorption scores came about
because a greater number of students (as opposed to artists) had greater reaction times
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when disengaging from other-focused thought, compared to self-focused thought. This
may have been due to the fact that, by some standards, college students could still be
considered as undergoing adolescence, a period that is characterized by increased
salience of social and peer interaction (Blakemore, 2008). Future studies seeking to
measure self-absorption that use adolescent samples should plan ahead for larger
numbers of participants, in order to ensure that they are well-powered enough to detect
the effects that they are hypothesizing.
Finally, Study 3 perhaps suffered from the greatest number of methodological
limitations. Even though collecting the data for this study online facilitated access to a
large and diverse sample, increasing power to detect the effects of interest, manipulation
checks indicated that the effects of the self-reflection priming on self-focused thought
were not strong enough to last throughout the emotion regulation task. Although
individual differences provided correlational evidence that was in line with our general
hypotheses, causal conclusions could not be drawn. Future studies that aim to manipulate
self-focused thought in order to observe its effects on other tasks are likely best carried
out in a well-controlled laboratory environment, and would be compelled to include
manipulations that are known to exert a continuous influence throughout those tasks,
such as the presence of a mirror or video camera (Carver & Scheier, 1978).
A more general aspect that may be viewed as a limitation is that, although the
three studies generally converge towards the same conclusion, there is a fair amount of
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method variance across them in terms of manipulations and measurements of emotion
and self-focused cognition. Although such variance provides an opportunity for
conceptual replication and may increase the generalizability of findings, it also carries the
danger of having increased the probability of observing significant effects (Type I error).
Although methods variance is unlikely to completely invalidate research findings,
especially when conclusions are drawn based on all available data from each study rather
than selective underreporting of acquired measures, and when and patterns of significant
and null effects rather than individual significant effects converge towards the same
general conclusion, this variance may bias the observed relationships among constructs
up to 26% according to some authors (see Doty & Glick, 1998). Future studies could
benefit from limiting the variance of manipulations and measurements across studies, as
this variance preempts formal comparisons between studies until enough data has been
collected for a meta-analysis. Instead, varying manipulations and measures within the
same study would permit a formal comparison of their effects.
Future Directions
With respect to mechanism, although the three studies provide evidence for an
effect of self-focused cognition on emotion regulation outcomes, they do not eliminate
the intriguing possibility that other-focus might have benefits that are unrelated to
disengaging self-focus. While it would be difficult to gather any evidence against this
latter theory using only behavioral data, as the two make the same prediction with respect
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to emotion regulation outcomes when comparing self-focused and other-focused
cognition, one comparison that might be informative is that between other-focused
cognition and spatial distancing (D’Argembeau, 2007; Koenigsberg et al., 2010) or
temporal distancing (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006). If other-focused cognition
has unique benefits, it should result in less difficult or more successful emotion regulation
than both spatial and temporal distancing. If, however, they are all merely providing a
way to disengage self-focused cognition, they should be equally beneficial.
More generally, elucidating the mechanism that is responsible for the effects of
other-focused cognition on emotion regulation may result in important breakthroughs for
the self-regulation literature. So far, the best alternative for decreasing the difficulty of
self-regulatory acts, and improving their success has been habit formation to a point
where these highly controlled processes become automatic (Muraven, Baumeister, &
Tice, 1999; Mauss et al., 2007), which involves a considerable initial investment of time
and effort. In contrast, a decrease in emotion regulation difficulty was obtained in Study 1
using a simple framing manipulation, which was effective right away, without any costs
for emotion regulation success. Tempting as it may be to apply the same framing
manipulation to other cognitive processes, it should be noted that cognitive reappraisal
may be uniquely suited to support such a frame, unlike other emotion regulation
strategies, and unlike other forms of self-regulation. Nonetheless, there are several other
self-regulatory behaviors that other authors have proposed could benefit from “hypo99

egoic regulation”, or a reduction in the amount of self-focused thought, such as skill
learning (see Leary, Adams, & Tate, 2010). The benefit that these self-regulatory
behaviors and emotion regulation derive from a reduction of self-focused thought could
rely on a common mechanism.
Until recently, emotion regulation has been studied almost exclusively in
intrapersonal contexts (Zaki & Williams, 2013). Interpersonal emotion regulation is an
exciting new area to readily benefit from the observation that other-focused reappraisal is
less difficult than self-focused reappraisal, for example via the study of transactive
processes in emotion regulation. Similar to transactive processes in memory (Wegner,
1985), transactive processes in emotion regulation could be viewed as a set of emotion
regulation strategies used by groups such as couples and families, that are potentially
more effective at a group level than at an individual level. Cognitive reappraisal could be
viewed as one such process, in so far groups who make use of other-focused cognitive
reappraisal to downregulate negative emotion should be able to thrive with respect to
emotion regulation, more than groups who use primarily self-focused strategies. Indeed,
Ryan, La Guardia, Solky-Butzel et al. (2005) have proposed that, across various groups,
relying on others for emotion regulation is generally associated with greater well-being.
This might mean that in general the quality of reappraisals generated for another person
surpasses that of reappraisals generated for oneself, however the few studies that have
compared interpersonal and intrapersonal cognitive reappraisal do not necessarily support
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this assertion (e.g. Hallam et al., 2014). The studies in this dissertation in turn suggest a
more intriguing mechanism whereby this association might be mediated by a decrease in
regulatory effort or difficulty when reappraisals are generated in service of another
person, particularly a close other.
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Appendix A – Supplementary Analyses
Study 2 – Analyses Selecting for Self-Absorption (RT Self > RT Other)
Although the self-absorption effect was not significantly different between
subsamples, as Block and Subsample did not interact to determine self-absorption,
F(1,58)=.51, p > .479, upon visual inspection, it was apparent that a greater proportion of
participants from the student sample (39%) compared to the artist sample (23%) did not
show a self-absorption effect. On the contrary, these participants were slower to react to
the interrupting sounds during the Other blocks compared to the Self blocks. Although
the presence or absence of a self-absorption effect was not a significant moderator of the
relationship between self-absorption and emotion regulation success or difficulty (p >
.18), we nonetheless explored whether the association between self-absorption and
emotion regulation outcomes for those participants who showed a self-absorption effect
in the first place (RT Self > RT Other). The results of these analyses for each emotion
regulation outcome are detailed below.
Emotional Reactivity. There was a trending negative association between their
self-absorption scores and emotional reactivity, r(40)= –.26, p < .110, such that
participants who were more self-absorbed were less emotionally reactive. This is
illustrated in Figure A. Analyses within each subsample indicated non-significant
associations in both the artist subsample, r1(17)= –.354, p > .165, and the student
subsample, r2(23)= –.276, p > .202. For participants who were not classified as selfabsorbed (RT Other > RT Self), there was, in turn, no evidence of a significant
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association between their self-absorption scores and emotional reactivity, r(20)= .16, p >
.508.
Emotion Regulation. There was a significant negative association between their
self-absorption scores and emotion regulation success, r(40)= –.33, p < .038. The slower
participants disengaged from self-focused thought, the less successfully they were able to
down-regulate their negative emotion. This is illustrated in Figure B. Analyses within
each subsample indicated a strong and significant negative association for artists, r1(17)=
–.53, p < .029, and a weaker association that did not reach significance for students,
r2(23)= –.31, p < .15. For participants who were not classified as self-absorbed (RT Other
> RT Self), there was, in turn, evidence of a significant positive association between their
self-absorption scores and emotion regulation success, r(20)= .48, p < .034, such that the
faster participants disengaged from self-focused thought, the less successfully they were
able to downregulate their negative emotion.
Emotion Regulation Difficulty. There was no significant association between
their self-absorption scores and emotion regulation success, r(39)= –.07, p > .684.
Analyses within each subsample indicated no significant association for artists, r1(16)= –
.01, p > .997, or students, r2(23)= –.10, p > .640. For participants who were not classified
as self-absorbed (RT Other > RT Self), there was also no evidence of a significant
positive association between their self-absorption scores and emotion regulation success,
r(20)= .07, p > .773, such that the faster participants disengaged from self-focused
thought, the less successfully they were able to downregulate their negative emotion.
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Figure A. Emotional reactivity difference scores by self-absorption in Study 2. Of those
participants who showed a self-absorption effect, the more self-absorbed they were, the
less emotionally reactive to the negative film, r(40)= –.264, p < .110.
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Figure B. Emotion regulation difference scores by self-absorption in Study 2. Of those
participants who showed a self-absorption effect, the more self-absorbed they were, the
less successful when down-regulating their negative emotion, r(40)= –.331, p < .038.
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Appendix B - Figures

Figure 1. Rating scale used in Study 1 to measure relationship closeness via inclusion of
other in the self. Adapted from Aaron, Aaron, & Smollan, 1992.
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Figure 2. Average inclusion of other in self ratings for the Close Other and Distant Other
conditions in Study 1. As expected, participants in the Close Other condition rated were
significantly closer to the person they thought of, F(1,61)=97.42, p < .001.Error bars
represent standard error of the mean.
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Figure 3. Average negative emotion ratings by Condition and Trial Type in Study 1. The
effect of Trial Type was not significantly different in the Self, Close Other, and Distant
Other conditions, F(4,186)=1.58, p > .183. Error bars represent the standard error of the
mean for each Trial Type.
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Figure 4. Average difficulty ratings by Condition and Instruction in Study 1. Participants
found reappraisal significantly more difficult in the Self condition compared to the Close
Other condition, t(62)=2.54, p < .015, but only marginally less difficult in the Self
condition compared to the Distant Other condition, t(61)=1.61, p < .113. Error bars
represent the standard error of the mean for each Instruction.
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Figure 5. Average handgrip endurance times by Condition in Study 1. Participants had
significantly lower endurance in the Self condition compared to both the Close Other
condition, t(56)= –2.72, p < .010, and the Distant Other condition, t(50)= –2.24, p < .031.
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean for each Condition.
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Figure 6. Sentence completion task used in Study 3 as a measure of self-focused thought
immediately after the emotion regulation task. Modeled after the “Linguistic Implications
Form” (Wegner & Giuliano, 1980).
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